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# 1NC SHELL

### Their calculations are not objective – there is no mechanism to predict or prepare for terrorism – reject all of their claims to knowledge and their truth claims for advantages and solvency and threats

Kessler and Daase, 2008

Sociology at Beilefeld & Daase Poli Sci at U of Munich 2008 Oliver & Christopher Alternatives p EBSCOhost

The objective is to develop means and methods to deal with uncertainty and reduce it to risk.46 Uncertainty is subsequently redefined in terms of contingency: One may not know what the next state of the world exactly is going to be but one can have a good guess and possibly find some insurance. To calculate risks does not mean that they can be measured objectively. Not all uncertainties are of quantitative nature and thus understandable within the common definition of rationality.47 In particular, the evaluation of risks may vary according to the political interests or cultural contexts If this is acknowledged, the traditional concept of deterministic causality loses its validity. Uncertain political results and uncertain strategies do not follow predetermined laws, but, if anything, probabilistic laws. Thus, what political scientists can achieve at best is probabilistic knowledge—that is, knowledge about necessary and sufficient reasons and causes that may not be able to predict single events but that do identify the conditions under which the realization of specific events is more or less likely.

If this is accepted, the question of how big the threat of international terrorism currently is can no longer be answered by pointing to the next terrorist act that will surely happen at some point in the future. For the fact that the current calm is just the calm before the next storm is as true as it is trivial. However, exactly such trivial insights that the next terrorist "attack" will happen determine current security policy discourses. There are two reasons for this. First, there are two equally inadequate standard models to examine the risk of terrorism.49 The one inquires into the motivational structure of terrorist groups and individual terrorists and tries to extrapolate future attacks from past terrorist activities. The other attempts to calculate the risk by multiplying expected losses by their probability of occurrence. The former is preferred by terrorism experts and regional specialists, the latter by decision makers and security analysts.

The problem of the first method, however, is that it cannot account for new developments and spontaneous changes in terrorist practices. There is always a first time when new strategies are used or new targets are selected. Even using planes as cruise missiles in order to destroy skyscrapers was an innovation not clearly foreseen by specialists, because such behavior was nearly unimaginable at the time. Extrapolation methods to determine terrorism risks are thus inherently conservative and tend to underestimate the danger.

The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason is that even the highest degree of improbability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss goes to infinity.^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and risk management as a rational endeavor breaks down. Under the historical condition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely absent.

The second form of security policy that emerges when the deterrence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastrophe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as constitutive for the logic itself; uncertainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, catastrophes happen at once, without a warning, but with major implications for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy. Since catastrophes happen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "rationality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the responsibility to provide security—as long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastrophe in various commissions dealing with the question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented.

This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as an anchor for measuring dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For example, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" currency to evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties.

# 1NC SHELL

### Failure to aknowledge the metaphysical aspect of terrorism ensures serial policy failure and escalating violence. Every time you say plan is focus you miss the larger manifestations of how your wOT politics are dangerous

Mitchell, 2005

### (Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, *Research in Phenomenology,* 35)

Heideggerian thought is a thinking that is engaged with its times. Whatever we might make of Heidegger’s political choices, the fact remains that even these decisions can be seen as attempts to think with and agauinst the times. It is no stretch to say that our time today is the time of terrorism—an uncommon time, no matter how common a claim this may be—especially in the United States. What then might a Heideggerian engagement with our time of terrorism bring to light? To answer this, it is important to note that Heideggerian thinking, as a thinking of being, must engage with its times precisely because it is through these times that we first find our access to being (or rather “beyng,” Seyn). For Heidegger, however, the contemporary scene is dominated by technology and, as his later writings endeavor to show, this is indicative of a “withdrawal” of beyng. Heidegger distinguishes himself from the various foes of technology, however, by viewing this withdrawal as nothing negative on its own. Instead, this withdrawal is a further dispensation of being. Beyng withdraws and grants us these withdrawn times. **This does not mean that beyng exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings**. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they exist. Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and to **think terrorism**. My contention in the following is that the withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where beings exist as terrorized. Terrorism, in other words, **is not simply the sum total of activities carried out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole**. Terrorism is consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This “ontological” point demands that there be the “ontic” threat of real terrorists. Further, **this metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail**. Political reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics. That is to say, political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism. In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politico-technological landscape against which terrorism takes place.

# 1NC SHELL

### Finally, hegemonic forms of thought are the LARGEST proximate cause of macro-level violence

### Burke, 2007

### (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, *Theory and Event*, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our **entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, **but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted** in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, **and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, **by being aware of its presence** and weight **and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action**.90

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

# 1NC SHELL

### This act of political refusal ruptures hegemonic forms of thought and allows for agency in the face of impossibility

Burke, 2002

### (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland , Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, **not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are**. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, **it is at these levels that we can intervene**. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.

This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, **discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible."** (62)

Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the **everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter**, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police.

The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter **that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other**. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

# Long 1NC EPISTEMOLOGY

### Their calculations are not objective – there is no mechanism to predict or prepare for terrorism – reject all of their claims to knowledge and their truth claims for advantages and solvency and threats

Kessler and Daase, 2008

Sociology at Beilefeld & Daase Poli Sci at U of Munich 2008 Oliver & Christopher Alternatives p EBSCOhost

The objective is to develop means and methods to deal with uncertainty and reduce it to risk.46 Uncertainty is subsequently redefined in terms of contingency: One may not know what the next state of the world exactly is going to be but one can have a good guess and possibly find some insurance. To calculate risks does not mean that they can be measured objectively. Not all uncertainties are of quantitative nature and thus understandable within the common definition of rationality.47 In particular, the evaluation of risks may vary according to the political interests or cultural contexts If this is acknowledged, the traditional concept of deterministic causality loses its validity. Uncertain political results and uncertain strategies do not follow predetermined laws, but, if anything, probabilistic laws. Thus, what political scientists can achieve at best is probabilistic knowledge—that is, knowledge about necessary and sufficient reasons and causes that may not be able to predict single events but that do identify the conditions under which the realization of specific events is more or less likely.

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# Long 1NC WOT - SERIAL FAILURE

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### Mitchell, 2005

### (Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, *Research in Phenomenology,* 35)

Heideggerian thought is a thinking that is engaged with its times. Whatever we might make of Heidegger’s political choices, the fact remains that even these decisions can be seen as attempts to think with and agauinst the times. It is no stretch to say that our time today is the time of terrorism—an uncommon time, no matter how common a claim this may be—especially in the United States. What then might a Heideggerian engagement with our time of terrorism bring to light? To answer this, it is important to note that Heideggerian thinking, as a thinking of being, must engage with its times precisely because it is through these times that we first find our access to being (or rather “beyng,” Seyn). For Heidegger, however, the contemporary scene is dominated by technology and, as his later writings endeavor to show, this is indicative of a “withdrawal” of beyng. Heidegger distinguishes himself from the various foes of technology, however, by viewing this withdrawal as nothing negative on its own. Instead, this withdrawal is a further dispensation of being. Beyng withdraws and grants us these withdrawn times. **This does not mean that beyng exists unperturbed somewhere behind or beyond these beings**. The withdrawal of being is found in these abandoned beings themselves and is determinative for the way they exist. Heideggerian thinking, then, allows us to ask the question of our times and to **think terrorism**. My contention in the following is that the withdrawal of being shows itself today in terrorism, where beings exist as terrorized. Terrorism, in other words, **is not simply the sum total of activities carried out by terrorist groups, but a challenge directed at beings as a whole**. Terrorism is consequently a metaphysical issue, and it names the way in which beings show themselves today, i.e., as terrorized. This “ontological” point demands that there be the “ontic” threat of real terrorists. Further, **this metaphysical aspect of terrorism also indicates that a purely political response to terrorism is destined to fail**. Political reactions to terrorism, which depict terrorism from the outset as a political problem, miss the fact that terrorism itself, qua metaphysical issue, is coincident with a transformation in politics. That is to say, political responses to terrorism fail to think terrorism. In what follows I will elaborate some of the consequences of thinking terrorism as a question of being and sketch a few characteristics of the politico-technological landscape against which terrorism takes place.

# Long 1NC WOT – CYCLES OF VIOLENCE

### The war on terror is the modern manifestation of this growing will-to-will and its objectification of the world CAN ONLY reproduce the conditions it needs to justify and sustain itself. To be today, is to be terrorised.

### Mitchell, 2005

### (Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, *Research in Phenomenology,* 35)

These three points of war equally determine an ideal of peace. War functions for Clausewitz as a forceful expression of will to overcome an opponent, guided by the view of an ideal (absolute). When that opponent is completely overcome—and the text vacillates at times between disarmament and utter destruction—which is to say, when that opponent is beaten in their will, then there can be peace: “Once the prize is in its hands, the political object has been achieved; there is no need to do more, and it can let matters rest. If the other state is ready to accept the situation, it should sue for peace.”9 In such an end, war reaches its goal: “we must always consider that with the conclusion of peace the purpose of the war has been achieved and its business is at an end.”10 For the enemy to press for peace demonstrates a weakened and depressed will to engage the opponent. But this is not to say that the will is beaten or that the fighting is over and done with. The only peace that could ensure this would be the peace resulting from an absolute war, where “hostilities could not end until one or other side were finally defeated.”11 Political intervention usually stops a war before this point is reached, with a result that hostilities can always be renewed. Hostilities may resume, Clausewitz clarifies, “but this only shows that not every war necessarily leads to a final decision and settlement.”12 Only an absolute war can lead to a final decision and settlement, which is to say, only an absolute war can lead to peace. Obviously, war and peace may not always be clearly distinguishable in reality, perhaps they are never so, but they are always so ideally. Clausewitz’s modern conception of warfare comes to an end with the end of modernity. Contemporary warfare, for its part, operates according to the influx of new technologies that are themselves part of a general technological “enframing” of the world. Enframing, Gestell, is Heidegger’s name for an era of technological supremacy where all of the world is brought ever closer together by a systematic **elimination of distance and difference** across the globe. The conditions of modern warfare listed above can find no hold here, and it is precisely where these conditions fail that we **are forced to think terrorism**. The technological era, as the era of terrorism, distinguishes itself from the modern on each of the three counts above. Opposition is no longer an operative concept for Heidegger, since technology has served to eradicate the distance that would separate the supposedly opposed parties. The analysis of technology in Heidegger’s work is guided by the (phenomenological) insight that “All distances in time and space are shrinking” (GA 79: 3; cf. GA 7: 157/PLT, 165).13 Airplanes, microwaves, e-mail, these serve to abbreviate the world, to be sure, but there is a metaphysical distance that has likewise been reduced, that between subject and object. This modern dualism has been surpassed by what Heidegger terms the standing-reserve (Bestand), the eerie companion of technological dominance and “enframing.” Insofar as an object (Gegenstand) would stand over against (Gegen) a subject, objects can no longer be found. “What stands by in the sense of standing-reserve, no longer stands over against us as object” (GA 7: 20/QCT, 17). A present object could stand over against another; the standing-reserve, however, precisely does not stand; instead, it circulates, and in this circulation it eludes the modern determination of thinghood. It is simply not present to be cast as a thing. With enframing, which names the dominance of position, positing, and posing (stellen) in all of its modes, things are no longer what they were. Everything becomes an item for ordering (bestellen) and delivering (zustellen); everything is “ready in place” (auf der Stelle zur Stelle), constantly available and replaceable (GA 79: 28). The standing-reserve “exists” within this cycle of order and delivery, exchange and replacement. This is not merely a development external to modern objects, but a change in their being. The standing-reserve is found only in its circulation along these supply channels, where one item is just as good as any other, where, in fact, one item is identical to any other. Replaceability is the being of things today. “Today being is being-replaceable” (VS, 107/62), Heidegger claims in 1969. The transformation is such that what is here now is not really here now, since there is an item identical to it somewhere else ready for delivery. This cycle of ordering and delivery does not operate serially, since we are no longer dealing with discrete, individual objects. Instead, there is only a steady circulation of the standing-reserve, which is here now just as much as it is there in storage. The standing-reserve spreads itself throughout the entirety of its replacement cycle, without being fully present at any point along the circuit. But it is not merely a matter of mass produced products being replaceable. To complete Heidegger’s view of the enframed standingreserve, we have to take into consideration the global role of value, a complementary determination of being: “Being has become value” (GA 5: 258/192). The Nietzschean legacy for the era of technology (Nietzsche as a thinker of values) is evident here. But the preponderance of value is so far from preserving differences and establishing order of rank, that it only serves to further level the ranks and establish the identity of everything with its replacement. When everything has a value, an exchangeability and replaceability operates laterally across continents, languages, and difference, with great homogenizing and globalizing effect. **The standing-reserve collapses opposition.** The will that dominates the modern era is personal, even if, as is the case with Leibniz, the ends of that will are not completely known by the self at any particular time. Nonetheless, the will still expresses the individuality of the person and one’s perspective. In the era of technology, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. In fact, the will in question no longer wills an object outside of itself, **but only wills itself; it is a will to will**. In this way, the will need never leave itself. This self-affirming character of the will allows the will an independence from the human. Manifest in the very workings of technology is a will to power, which for Heidegger is always a will to will. Because the will to will has no goal outside of it, its willing is goalless and endless. **The human is just another piece of a standing-reserve that circulates without purpose**. Actually, things have not yet gone so far; the human still retains a distinction, however illusive, as “the most important raw material” (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). This importance has nothing to do with the personal willing of conditional goals, as Heidegger immediately makes clear, “The human is the ‘most important raw material’ because he remains the subject of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionally in this process and **simultaneously becomes the ‘object’** of the abandonment of being” (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). Unconditioned willing transcends the merely human will, which satisfies itself with restricted goals and accomplishments. Unconditioned willing makes of the subject an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to objectify everything. The more **the world comes to stand at the will’s disposal**, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. For this reason—and the following is something often overlooked in considering Heidegger’s political position between the wars—Heidegger is critical of the very notion of a Führer, or leader, who would direct the circulation of the standing-reserve according to his own personal will. The leaders of today are merely the necessary accompaniment of a standing-reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders’ seeming position of “subjectivity,” that they are the ones who decide, is again another working of “objectification,” where neither of these terms quite fits, given that beings are no longer objective. The willfulness of the leaders is not due to a personal will: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will [Eigensinn]. In truth, however, leaders are the necessary consequence of the fact that beings have gone over to a way of errancy, in which an emptiness expands that requires a single ordering and securing of beings. (GA 7: 89/EP, 105; tm) The leaders do not stand above or control the proceedings, the proceedings in question affect beings as a whole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points of convergence or conduits for the channels of circulation; they are needed for circulation, but are nowhere outside of it. No leader is the sole authority; instead, there are numerous “sectors” to which each leader is assigned. The demands of these sectors will be similar of course, organized around efficiency and productivity in distribution and circulation. In short, **leaders serve the standing-reserve**. Any goal beyond the will itself, any political goal, for example, will not be able to voice itself over the will’s own monologue. Insofar as modern warfare was a use of force for political goals, modern warfare is surpassed. The will surrenders its relation to the object in order to will itself all the more forcefully. It reaches a point where no political, which is to say “external,” goal can reach it. There can be no opposition when the will recognizes nothing but itself, and the more the will succeeds in this, the more impersonal it becomes. Politics’ effectiveness withers away in this transformation, since the goals of politics remain always conditional. **The unconditional will is apolitical**, and this transforms the relation between war and politics as expressed in Clausewitz’s famed dictum. War is not, as Clausewitz still thinks, the continuation of politics by other means. If “war” means the “total war,” i.e. the war that arises from the machination of beings here let loose, then it becomes a transformation of “politics” and a revelation of the fact that “politics” and every plan-directed course of life were themselves only ever the uncontrolled execution of metaphysical decisions that they do not master. (GA 69: 209) The transformation of war into terrorism, since this is what we are talking about when we talk about the machination of beings, **is equally a transformation of politics.** The metaphysical decisions beyond our control are those having to do with being as replaceable value. Political decisions are not made by leaders who would be in control of the matters decided. These decisions are nothing that we could willfully decide. Politics becomes in this a means of directing life according to a plan. We will return to this idea of planning when considering its role for our general “security.” For now it is enough to note that with this transformation in the nature of politics, it can no longer be said to precede its “continuation” in war. The transformation of war in total war (or terrorism) is equally a transformation of politics: Such a war does not continue something already present, but rather compels this into the execution of essential decisions, of with it itself is not master. For this reason, such a war no longer admits of “conquerors and conquered”; all become slaves of the history of being. (GA 69: 209; em) Conquered and conqueror are both political designations and are each outmoded today. The leaders are slaves. We have already stated that technology closes the gap between subject and object, with the human becoming just another piece of the standing-reserve alongside all the rest. The abolition of distance is equally an abolition of difference, including that between the real and the ideal. For Clausewitz, this difference was a fact expressed in each of the innumerable ways that the material world failed to live up to the “smoothness” of the ideal. There is inadequate information, a change of attitude within the atmosphere of danger, questions of morale and willingness for both the troops and the general; there are coincidences, surprises, the resistance of the terrain—all of which prevent a general from simply and directly executing a war, but instead require strategizing. Strategy serves as a technical term for Clausewitz, denoting the skill of the general in best realizing the ideal situation of absolute war within the real material conditions that the battle presents. Perhaps the roughest area of friction that a general must consider is found in his/her greatest asset, the troops. Modern warfare is a matter of troop mobilization, assault, reinforcement, and defense; and for this reason, consumption of resources remained a concern for Clausewitz. The troops were the most important resource for the realization of “total” war; they were needed to negotiate the distance that yet extended between the ideal and the real. A consequence of this is that modern warfare could still concern itself with calculating and comparing casualties and losses. In an ideal situation, troops would offer no resistance and never be lost. Such is the case with war under the reign of technology. With everything available as standing-reserve, troops included, the exhaustion of resources is no longer possible. Resources are precisely in themselves replaceable, to the extent that, in being given over to replacement, even the idea of an “in itself” is already drained of reality ahead of time. There are no longer any “losses” that cannot be replaced. In other words, there is no longer any friction**. All uncertainty is lost, since it is not recognized in the first place.** Everything is monitored and controlled. The whole “battle” is given over to a planning that is able to incorporate everything it encounters, since it only ever encounters what is already planable in essence, the standingreserve. Strategy’s demise is the ascendancy of planning. What this means is that war can now go on interminably, subject to no other logic or obligation than its own. Nothing can resist it. But without resistance, war must end. Peace can now go on interminably as well, subject to no other logic or obligation than its own. The logic in question for both war and peace is the logic of replacement, the obligation for each is the obligation to consume. There is no law that would supervene or subtend consumption; there is no order outside of it that could contain it. Clausewitz’s ideal is realized in a manner that collapses the very distinctions that gave it birth. “War” is no longer a duel; it recognizes no authority outside of itself. The name for this new amalgam of war and peace is terrorism. Terrorism is Clausewitz’s absolute war in the mirror of technology. War and peace come to complete agreement and lose their oppositional identity in the age of value and the ersatz. Without concern for resources, consumption continues untroubled, since war is a kind of “consumption of beings” no different from peace: “War no longer battles against a state of peace, rather it newly establishes the essence of peace” (GA 69: 180). The essence of peace so established is a peace that defines itself in regards to war, which binds itself inseparably to war, and which functions equivalently to war. In either case, it is simply a matter of resource consumption and replenishment. In Clausewitzian terms, there is perhaps too much continuity or “continuation” between war and peace, “War has become a distortion of the consumption of beings which is continued in peace” (GA 7: 89/EP, 104). The peace that technology brings is nothing restful; instead **it is the peace of unhindered circulation.** We cannot even ask when there will be peace or when the war will end. Such a question, Heidegger specifies, cannot be answered, “not because the length of the war cannot be foreseen, but because the question itself asks for something which no longer is, since already there is no longer a war that would be able to come to a peace” (GA 7: 89/EP, 104; tm). The basic oppositions of Clausewitzian warfare are undone at this point, an undoing that includes the distinction between ideal and real. It also includes the distinction between soldier and civilian. Since such distinctions depend upon a difference between war and peace, they too can no longer apply. Everyone is now a civilian-soldier, or neither a civilian nor a soldier—a “worker,” one might say, or otherwise put, a target. With everyone involved in the same processes of consumption and delivery, everyone is already enlisted in advance. There are no longer any “innocent” victims or bystanders in this, and the same holds true of terrorism. Terrorism is not the use of warfare against civilians (pace Carr), for the simple reason that there no longer are any civilians.14 It is equally not war against soldiers, and for this reason we go wrong to even consider it war. Terrorism is the only conflict available and the only conflict that is in essence available and applicable. It can have everything as its target. Terrorism follows from the transformation in beings indicative of the technological age. This transformation remains important at each point of a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism and is the ultimate consequence of the abolition of war and peace; beings have become uncommon.

# Long 1NC WOT IMPACT - UNGRIEVABLE VIOLENCE

### War on terrorism is based on a politic of ungrievable life resulting in open ended extermination

Butler 2004

Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley 2004 Judith Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence page 33-35

If violence is done against those who are unreal, then, from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated. But they have a strange way of remaining animate and so must be negated again (and again). They cannot be mourned because they are always already lost or, rather, never “were,” and they must be killed since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness. Violence renews itself in the face of the apparent inexhaustibility of its object. The derealization of the “Other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy, regardless of whether or not there are established grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims.

How do we understand this derealization? It is one thing to argue that first, on the level of discourse, certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, that they fit no dominant frame for the human, and that their dehumanization occurs first, at this level, and that this level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization that is already at work in culture. It is another thing to say that discourse itself effects violence through omission. If 200,000 Iraqi children were killed during the Gulf War and its aftermath,7 do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, singly or collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? Are there names attached to those children?

There are no obituaries for the war casualties that the United States inflicts, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for recognition. Although we might argue that it would be impractical to write obituaries for all those people, or for all people, I think we have to ask, again and again, how the obituary functions as the instrument by which grievability is publicly distributed. It is the means by which a life becomes, or fails to become, a publicly grievable life, an icon for national self-recognition, the means by which a life becomes noteworthy. As a result, we have to consider the obituary as an act of nation-building. The matter is not a simple one, for, if a life is not grievable, it is not quite a life; it does not qualify as a life and is not worth a note. It is already the unburied, if not the unburiable.

It is not simply, then, that there is a “discourse” of dehumanization that produces these effects, but rather that there is a limit to discourse that establishes the limits of human intelligibility. It is not just that a death is poorly marked, but that it is unmarkable. Such a death vanishes, not in explicit discourse, but in the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds. The queer lives that vanished on September 11 were not publicly welcomed into the idea of national identity built in the obituary pages, and their closest relations were only belatedly and selectively (the martial norm holding sway once again) made eligible for benefits. But this should come as no surprise, when we think about how few deaths from AIDS were publicly grievable losses, and how, for instance, the extensive deaths now taking place in Africa are also, in the media, for the most part unmarkable and ungrievable.

# Long 1NC WOT – NECESSITATES GLOBAL VIOLENCE

### Refusing the paradigm of the war on terror is key to non-violent solutions to global problems

Butler 2004

Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley 2004 Judith Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence page xii-xiii

That we can be injured, that others can be injured, that we are subject to death at the whim of another, are all reasons for both fear and grief. What is less certain, however, is whether the experiences of vulnerability and loss have to lead straightaway to military violence and retribution. There are other passages. If we are interested in arresting cycles of violence to produce less violent outcomes, it is no doubt important to ask what, politically, might be made of grief besides a cry for war.

One insight that injury affords is that there are others out there on whom my life depends, people I do not know and may never know. This fundamental dependency on anonymous others is not a condition that I can will away. No security measure will foreclose this dependency; no violent act of sovereignty will rid the world of this fact. What this means, concretely, will vary across the globe. There are ways of distributing vulnerability, differential forms of allocation that make some populations more subject to arbitrary violence then others. But in that order of things, it would not be possible to maintain that the US has greater security problems than some of the more contested and vulnerable nations and peoples of the world. To be injured means that one has the chance to reflect upon injury, to find out the mechanisms of its distribution, to find out who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected violence, dispossession, and fear, and in what ways. If national sovereignty is challenged, that does not mean it must be shored up at all costs, if that results in suspending civil liberties and suppressing political dissent. Rather, the dislocation from First World privilege, however temporary, offers a chance to start to imagine a world in which that violence might be minimized, in which an inevitable interdependency becomes acknowledged as the basis for global political community. I confess to not knowing how to theorize that interdependency. I would suggest, however, that both our political and ethical responsibilities are rooted in the recognition that radical forms of self-sufficiency and unbridled sovereignty are, by definition, disrupted by the larger global processes of which they are a part, that no final control can be secured, and that final control is not, cannot be, an ultimate value.

# Long 1NC WOT – UNGRIEVEABLE VIOLENCE IMPACT

### The affirmative only attempts to make the war on terror more effective this denies the bodies they sacrifice in the name of fighting terrorism

Butler 2004

Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley 2004 Judith Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence page 5-7

Our own acts of violence do not receive graphic coverage in the press, and so they remain acts that are justified in the name of self-defense, but by a noble cause, namely, the rooting out of terrorism. At one point during the war against Afghanistan, it was reported that the Northern Alliance may have slaughtered a village: Was this to be investigated and, if confirmed, prosecuted as a war crime? When a bleeding child or dead body on Afghan soil emerges in the press coverage, it is not relayed as part of the horror of war, but only in the service of a criticism of the military’s capacity to aim its bombs right. We castigate ourselves for not aiming better, as if the end goal is to aim right. We do not, however, take the sign of destroyed life and decimated peoples as something for which we are responsible, or indeed understand how that decimation works to confirm the United States as performing atrocities. Our own acts are not considered terrorist. And there is no history of acts that is relevant to the self-understanding we form in the light of these terrible events. There is no relevant prehistory to the events of September 11, since to begin to tell the story a different way, to ask how things came to this, is already to complicate the question of agency which, no doubt, leads to the fear of moral equivocation. In order to condemn these acts as inexcusable, absolutely wrong, in order to sustain the affective structure in which we are, on the one hand, victimized and, on the other, engaged in a righteous cause of rooting out terror, we have to begin the story with the experience of violence we suffered.

We have to shore up the first-person point of view, and preclude from the telling accounts that might involve a decentering of the narrative “I” within the international political domain. This decentering is experienced as part of the wound that we have suffered, though, so we cannot inhabit that position. This decentering is precisely what we seek to rectify through a recentering. A narrative form emerges to compensate for the enormous narcissistic wound opened up by the public display of our physical vulnerability. Our response, accordingly, is not to enter into international coalitions where we understand ourselves to be working with institutionally established routes of consensus-building. We relegate the United Nations to a second-order deliberative body, and insist instead on American unilateralism. And subsequently we ask, Who is with us? Who is against us? As a result, we respond to the exposure of vulnerability with an assertion of US “leadership,” showing once again the contempt we have for international coalitions that are not built and led by us. Such coalitions do not conflict with US supremacy, but confirms it, stoke it, insist upon it, with long-term implications for the future shape and possibility of global cooperation.

# Long 1NC WOT UNGREIVEABLE VIOLENCE IMPACTS

### This ideology of ungrievable violence for innocents killed in WOT leads to infinite war

Butler 2004

Maxine Elliot Professor in Rhetoric and Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley 2004 Judith Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence page 28-29

Mourning, fear, anxiety, rage. In the United States, we have been surrounded with violence, having perpetrated it and perpetrating it still, having suffered it, living in fear of it, planning more of it; if not an open future of infinite war in the name of a "war on terrorism." Violence is surely a touch of the worst order, a way a primary human vulnerability to other humans is exposed in its most terrifying way, a way in which we are given over, without control, to the will of another, a way in which life itself can be expunged by the willful action of another. To the extent that we commit violence we are acting on another, putting the other at risk, causing the other damage, threatening to expunge the other. In a way, we all live with this particular vulnerability, a vulnerability to the other that is part of bodily life, a vulnerability to a sudden address from elsewhere that we cannot preempt. This vulnerability, however, becomes highly exacerbated under certain social and political conditions especially those in which violence is a way of life and the means to secure self-defense are limited.

Mindfulness of this vulnerability can become the basis of claims for non-military political solutions, just as denial of this vulnerability through a fantasy of mastery (an institutionalized fantasy of mastery) can fuel the instruments of war. We cannot however, will away this vulnerability. We must attend to it, even abide by it, as we begin to think about what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of corporeal vulnerability itself, 'a situation in which we can be vanquished or lose others. Is there something to be learned about the geopolitical distribution of corporeal vulnerability from our own brief and devastating exposure to this condition?

# Long 1NC WOT – MACRO LEVEL VIOLENCE IMPACT

### Finally, hegemonic forms of thought are the LARGEST proximate cause of macro-level violence

### Burke, 2007

### (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, *Theory and Event*, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our **entire space of truth and existence**. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, **but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted** in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, **policymakers' choices become necessities**, their actions become inevitabilities, **and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, **by being aware of its presence** and weight **and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action**.90

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

# Long 1NC ALT – POLITICAL REFUSAL

### This act of political refusal ruptures hegemonic forms of thought and allows for agency in the face of impossibility

### Burke, 2002

### (Anthony, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland , Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27.1 page InfoTrac OneFile)

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available--and where they are not, the effort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effective when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired--which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was conditional on it being credible to the governed as well as the governing. (60) This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, **not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are**. (61 ) Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, **it is at these levels that we can intervene**. We can critique the machinic frameworks of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web.

This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first asserts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of rebellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discursive order and influence its shifting boundaries.... By doing so, **discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible."** (62)

Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many levels--that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cultural, and economic implications of the **everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter**, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police.

The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Conolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical relationship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"--an encounter **that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other**. (63) Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"--a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

# WOT BAD - TERRORISM IS PART OF DEMOCRACY

### Terrorism is the result of this solidification of politics. Exclusion from all encompassing rational order leaves only the unreason in the form of raw violence. Terrorism is the means by which the individual re-inserts into a political where they do not count. Making democracy calculable simultaneously effaces it.

Schmidt 2008

(Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

In place of any possible sovereign power, today we find the final possible alternative to the present shape of power. What is left as such an alternative is the power of individuals who stand completely apart from sovereignty and the turnover of power. We call such individuals “terrorists”—those whose power is terrible, terrifying, and monstrous—simply because the form of the power they express is outside that which has no outside. What is left, what is expressed by such power, is the assertion of unreason and real powerlessness in the form of the individual.30 What is left is irrational, incalculable, inefficient, non- sense. Such is the only remaining outside of power, and so long as there are no alternatives, such explosive expressions of powerlessness will not cease. Efforts to step outside the static tyranny of the new form of power as it is figured by globalized technology will always have something of desperation about them, something of nihilism, since it is a form of power that will not turn itself over. When the locus of power is no longer able to be contested, when power has calcified and become total leaving no alternative political power, then simple violence, naked brutality, is all that remains as a means of contesting the established power. There has always been political brutality and unspeakable violence; our age did not invent terror and horror. But our age has witnessed an intensification of certain dimensions of violence, an intensification changing the landscape of every exercise of power and turning the attempt to contest power into violence of a new order: open, public spaces can now be dangerous, no one is considered innocent, children have become weapons as well as targets, strangers are threatening, the material shapes of everyday life— airplanes, envelopes, shoes—are turned back upon individuals as weapons. Sovereign nations are not attacked, individuals are attacked. In short, the old forms by which those in power were confronted and power was contested have taken a new form, namely the form of raw violence, and the reason for this is that the power in power is itself a fundamentally new form. Or, so Heidegger would argue.

In the Greek world of its beginnings, democracy rested upon two sets of necessary conditions. The first of these conditions took the form of a prior agreement, the consent of all who would be citizens, to abide by the rule of the majority. This condition is met by individuals prior to any sense that there is a ␣␣␣␣␣. It is something of a pledge in which each person agrees to abide by a count, by numbers, that has yet to be tabulated. The second of the conditions requisite for democracy is, as Aristotle argued, the freedom of every individual, the absence of any coercion in matters of the democratic process, in the voice one has, and equally, the equality of all individuals when it comes to the matter of counting.31 These conditions are, of course, at odds: the first requires that each citizen be recognized as a singular being, an end unto him/herself, the second requires a reduction of each citizen to an abstract equality in which no one is different. If Heidegger’s claims about the present historical juncture are right, if we do indeed live in an age in which a sort of reduction to what is calculable is definitive, an age in which singularity is effaced, if not erased, then one can see how it is that the conditions of democratic life are in jeopardy. Despite the glaring inequities in the world, a curious equalization of everyone as an abstraction, as a simple number, is being achieved today, and at the same time, the singularity that is the locus of freedom seems more than ever to be alienated. Facing a form of power that will not turn over, the source of which will not change, any people, all peoples, seem to be in the strange condition of being outsiders.

If Heidegger’s argument about the nature of technological reason, the Gestell and Machenschaft, is right, then **the possibilities of democracy in our time must indeed be considered in the light of the challenges of technological reason and the globalization that such rationality makes possible**. Above all, one must ask how it is that we can preserve—or perhaps recover—**an openness permitting the appearance of individuals in their singularity, that is, in their difference from others**. One must also ask, just as urgently, **how it is that power can transfer itself and not be calcified into one form.** In other words, **how it might be possible for history to begin again.** Heidegger expressed a sense of helplessness before this question: “only a god can save us,” he said.32 That comment is not a declaration of faith; it is rather a statement of despair and hopelessness: we are powerless, only an outside, something beyond our understanding, can introduce change and set history into motion anew. It is not difficult to see the reasons for such a claim: **globalization has, by virtue of the technologies that drive it and render it possible, shown itself to be a homogenization of the world and a shrinking of the spaces of political life, the spaces, that is, of differences.** Nonetheless, **one can still ask if this totalization and closure of the space of political life is indeed so seamless.**

# WOT BAD – MAKES DEMOCRACY VIOLENT

Terrorism is the foremost concern for geopolitics today. Our context is only thinkable with terrorism. The west’s construction of the other structures democracy so as to be a violent containment of similarity reducing the other to enemy.

**Kuswa and Walsh 2007**

(Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Toward unraveling this idea, we will move through three sections: a con- textual assessment of democracy in an era of conflict and terrorism, a detour through two of John Dewey’s contributions related to politics and pedagogy, and a quest for a non-mediating rhetoric that can translate “anti-war” politics into a space for unconditional encounters with the Other.a The first section dives into the context of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the formation of new stereotypes, new geopolitical divisions, and an ever-evolving clash of cultures. What does it mean to live in an era of terrorism? Looking at how terrorism defines much of our current location in history must remain on the agenda, for the methods and practices of democracy are now tied up in the knots of violence, security, and the false binary between an American citizen- ship and the meaning of the West’s Other. Terrorism is not simply about the United States’ conception of stateless violence, despite what policy-makers will declare, even though the constructed nature of the binary that divides “with us” from “against us” means that everyone is implicated in the way the United States draws lines between friends and enemies.

The second section will introduce a little-known passage by John Dewey that calls for the “abolition of war.” By way of exploring the possibilities of Dewey’s romantic message, we then turn to the evolution of critical pedagogy where we find, unfortunately, a number of idealistic and abstract insights, often appearing as simple appeals to tolerance and understanding. In spe- cific contexts, though, most notably moments when the concept of terrorism intersects argumentation, the need for a utopian space informed by the tenets of critical pedagogy is acute. Answering Dewey’s call for an open-ended criti- cal pedagogy that works to isolate and reject the rush to “mediating rhetoric” (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996), the third and final section will argue that an effective and radical democracy must carve out spaces free from threat projections and unquestioned representations. When depictions of the Other are dehumanizing and pre-committed to certain judgments, the consequence is a democracy of containment that thrives on enemy-creation and acts to block the possibility of sincere and expressive engagements between selves and Others.

Confronting War and Terror, Past and Present

We begin with an attempt to contextualize what democracy means, or could mean, during a time marked by the United States government’s particular ways of pursuing a war on terrorism. On the other hand, there are very practical limits to any writing about democracy and education, let alone a journal article written in an academic voice for an academic audience. Despite these limits (restricted audience, resources, means of organizing direct action), deliberation regarding theories of education is still an important site for change. Indeed, education represents an intersection between thinking about terrorism and policies governing terrorism (Wells, 2003).

An example of a scholar contributing to critical theory as praxis, Henry Giroux published two articles in 2006 (2006a, 2006b) that stress the need for critical pedagogy in the face of the global war on terror. His general position is that the way counter-terrorism is practiced threatens to erase all of our civil liberties and could kill democracy in an attempt to save it. Giroux heightens his impact by drawing on the increasingly common contention that state control in the United States is chilling academic freedom and criticism of official policy. Wiretapping and surveillance are the cusp of unimpeded police powers and profiling that includes many groups within the academic community. To be fair, though, Giroux’s work should not be exempt from the requirement to present an alternative. In other words, what are the specific theories or reforms available and how can they be applied in direct and meaningful ways?

# WOT BAD – EXTERMINATION IMPACT

### Terrorism is not stable either. Does a act of political violence make someone a terrorist? One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Rigid determinations of political legitimacy become more problematic as the dangerous other is though to be everywhere and the solution is exermination.

**Kuswa and Walsh 2007**

(Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Audrey Kirth Cronin (2003, 32) discusses the difficulties in trying to define terrorism and responses to it, commenting that terrorism is especially difficult to pinpoint because the term has “evolved and...because it is associ- ated with an activity that is designed to be subjective.” Cronin asserts that the targets of terrorism are not only, or even primarily, the victims who are killed or harmed in the attacks. The secondary and perhaps more signifi- cant targets are “the governments, publics, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction—such as fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, or radicalization” (Cronin, 2003, 32).d Terrorism is a matter of perception and can be interpreted differently, making rigid determinations of “us” and “them” even more pernicious. Like much of the information about al Qaeda, overt and omnipresent, Cold War propaganda infused all areas of life, including school textbooks and literature selected for school readings. Shaw writes: “Was all culture, on both sides of the Cold War, merely an extension of politics? If so, how could this alter our perception of the conflict?” (2001, 61) In other words, how does a national culture portray an enemy or a conflict in terms of a necessary solution? What solution fits the harm? If the problem is everywhere, or at least could be anywhere, the appropriate solution is more likely to be a sweeping purge and less consistent with democratic principles. This is not a defense of today’s means of implementing democracy—the practices of so-called democratic nations—but a defense of the possibility of democracy, the promise of an idea, a Derridean gesture to the need for the impossible. “I continue to believe that it is faith in the possibility of this impossible...that must govern all of our decisions” (Derrida, 2003, 115).

In a provocative interview, Derrida speaks about the significance of 9/11 as a major event, hinting that the horror of the attack itself was also its literal hijacking of the future, its announcement that there could be an even bigger event—that the worst has yet to come. Derrida says, “Traumatism is pro- duced by the future, by the to come, by the threat of the worst to come” (2003, 97). Interestingly, the concept of the “possible impossible,” or the future that is yet to come, is also Derrida’s defense of democracy later in the same inter- view. To explain further, Derrida is not apologizing for democracy’s failures and defending the existing array of liberal democratic states in the world; on the contrary, he is imagining a demo-cracy. This demo-cracy, perhaps a utopia,e should be for and by the people as well as poised toward a future of furthering justice through law. ‘Democracy to come’ does not mean a future democracy that will one day be ‘present.’ Democracy will never exist in the present; it is not presentable, and it is not a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. But there is the impossible, whose promise democracy inscribes—a promise that risks and must always risk being perverted into a threat. (130)

Moreover, the promises of democracy, let alone its implementation, are as diverse as they are contradictory. Here we adopt a view of (radical) democracy as an unreachable condition of universal human rights with no entry require- ment other than being human. Derrida is reluctant to commit to terms like “citizenship” or “human rights” even though he eventually uses these concepts to articulate the possibilities for rethinking “the political” and moving beyond the trappings of national sovereignty.

# WOT BAD – STANDING RESERVE

This impossible quest for security has become a will-to-will that admits no questioning and organizes all of politics such that all actions are taken merely for the reproduction of the same. This global enframing NECESSITATES that certain popultaions such as immigrants and terrorists fall OUTSIDE of its attempt at creating global order through standing reserve.

Mitchell, 2005

### (Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, Research in Phenomenology, 35)

There can be no security. If being is what threatens then security as the absence of terror would be the absence of being. But the absence of being is precisely the threat. Obviously, security is just as little to be found in the absence of danger as it is in the consummation of the danger, total annihilation. Instead, security is to be found within the danger and threat of being. But how? Heidegger likewise provides us endangered ones with a way of thinking security and preservation. This is his fourth contribution to a thinking of terrorism.

Security and assurance, both equally apt translations of the German Sicherung, are indissociable from certainty (Gewißheit) for Heidegger. In the course of the 1968 seminar in Le Thor, Heidegger provides a brief history of this relation between security and certainty: “the quest for certainty appears first in the domain of faith, as the search for the certainty of salvation (Luther), then in the domain of physics as the search for the mathematical certainty of nature (Galileo)” (VS, 30/13). Heidegger unites these two concerns for certainty within a single concept: assurance (Sicherung), “In the quest for mathematical certainty, what is sought is the assurance of man in nature, in the sensible; in the quest for the certainty of salvation, what is sought is the assurance of man in the supra-sensible world” (VS, 30/14).22 Certainty is in the service of assurance or security and is only the epistemological aspect of a greater ontological condition of security. Security is freedom from uncertainty in all of its forms, **sensible, super-sensible, and ontological**. Salvation and the mathematical certainty of nature are themselves to be understood as instances of an ontological assurance against uncertainty. Ontological uncertainty would be found in conceptions of singularity, where the uniqueness of a thing renders it irreplaceable and thus opens us to the possibility of loss, or in conceptions of alterity, where the other is not anticipated and confined in advance to the strictures of categorical thought. Uncertainty in this broader sense is eliminated in security. One is securely insulated against these differences of the world. For modern thought, the securing of representations for representational thinking provided the backdrop for the arrival of certainty (see GA 7: 82; EP, 98). Modern metaphysics itself, according to Heidegger, “means the securing of the human being by itself and for itself” (GA 67: 167). **Such a policy must be abandoned as the human becomes more and more a piece of the standing-reserve like everything else**. This postmodern security is accomplished through bestowal and appraisal of value, “Securement, as the obtaining of security, is a grounding in valuation” (GA 5: 262/195; tm). What is valued can be replaced by something of equal value, and this fact lies at the center of our conception of security today. Securement, as a giving of value, assures us against loss by making the world replaceable. In this respect, security is nothing other than total availability, imagined as a world of utter transparency where all resources, human and otherwise, are constantly surveilled and traced through their paths of circulation. The transformation in being coincident with the end of modern warfare likewise puts an end to modern politics and establishes in its place an impersonal commitment to the furthering of planned replacement. Security is only possible when everything works according to these plans, and this requires “leaders,” whose true function now becomes evident. For the plan, “the necessity of ‘leadership’, that is, the planned calculation of the securing of the whole of beings, is required” (GA 7: 89–90/EP, 105; tm). The demand for security is always a call for such Führers. Planning is a matter of ensuring the smooth and “frictionless” circulation of resources along channels and pipelines of order and delivery. The plan’s success is assured from the outset, because beings are now in essence planable. The mathematical tracking of stock and supplies becomes a total tracking when things have become completely available. Nothing is concealed from this taking of inventory, with the effect that the mathematical model of the thing is no different from the thing itself. The mathematical modeling of things, an operation that Heidegger traces back to Ockham and the nominalist split between word and thing (see VS, 30–31/13–14), is paradigmatic for the disappearance of identifiably discrete beings under the rule of technology. The model is no longer a representation of what is modeled but, in a paradoxical manner, the thing itself. Nothing beyond the thing’s mathematical model is recognized. Everything essential to the thing is contained in the model, without remainder. Such is the truth of the standing-reserve; it is a collapse of the distances that made possible representation. Without that spacing, there is only the suffocating rush of the standing-reserve along the circuitry of the plan. The plan makes manifest the self-willing nature of technology, in that the plan has no purpose other than to assure its own expansion and increase. For the plan to function, it is therefore necessary that beings be consumed and their replacements follow right upon them. The plan plans for consumption, outlining the paths and channels that the standing-reserve will occupy in its compelled obedience to order. The world wars have pointed towards this end, according to Heidegger, for “They press toward a securing of resources [Bestandsicherung] for a constant form of consumption” (GA 7: 88; EP, 103–4; tm). This consumption is synonymous with replacement, since there is nothing lost in consumption that is not immediately replaced. The plan is to protect itself from loss by completely insulating itself from uncertainty. The plan seeks “the ‘all-inclusive’ [restlose] securing of the ordering of order” (GA 7: 92; EP, 107; tm). Order is only secured when there is nothing that resists it, nothing that remains in “disorder.” Any remainder would stand outside of the prevailing order, as would any difference, in complete disorder. There is another Nietzschean intimation in this, as Heidegger reads the will to power as a drive to secure and order all chaos. Without remainder (restlose), without rest, the standing-reserve threatens to encompass everything in a monotonous, swirling sameness. **The more secure the world becomes, the greater is the abandonment of being as it is further enframed within the plan.**

Homeland security is thus an oxymoron, since one of the most prominent effects of planning is the elimination of national differences and “homelands.” Security itself is precisely the planned elimination of differences, and as for “homeland,” it is ever more difficult to conceive of a homeland that would be nationally distinct from another. This is not to be understood as a complaint against internationalism either, for “Just as the distinction between war and peace has become untenable, the distinction between ‘national’ and ‘international’ has also collapsed” (GA 7: 92; EP, 107). We have already seen that Heidegger attributes a will to the annihilation of homeland to Americanism; what needs to be added to this view is that there is not one form of government any different; each is run by leaders: The uniformity of beings arising from the emptiness of the abandonment of Being, in which it is only a matter of the calculable security of its order, an order which it subjugates to the will to will, this uniformity also conditions everywhere in advance of all national differences the uniformity of leadership [Führerschaft], **for which all forms of government are only one instrument** of leadership among others. (GA 7: 93; EP, 108; tm) Government and politics are simply further means of directing ways of life according to plan; and no one, neither terrorist nor politician, should be able to alter these carefully constructed ways of life. Ways of life are themselves effects of the plan, and the predominant way of life today is that of an all-consuming Americanism. National differences fall to the wayside. The homeland, when not completely outmoded, can only appear as commodified quaintness. All governments participate in the eradication of national differences. Insofar as Americanism represents the attempt to annihilate the “homeland,” then under the aegis of the abandonment of being, all governments and forms of leadership become Americanism. The loss of national differences is accordant with the advent of terrorism, since terrorism knows no national bounds but, rather, threatens difference and boundaries as such. Terrorism is everywhere, where “everywhere” no longer refers to a collection of distinct places and locations but instead to a “here” that is the same as there, as every “there.” The threat of terrorism is not international, but antinational or, to strain a Heideggerian formulation, unnational. Homeland security, insofar as it destroys the very thing that it claims to protect, is nothing opposed to terrorism, but rather the consummation of its threat. **Our leaders, in their attempt to secure the world against terrorism, only serve to further drive the world towards its homogenized state.** The elimination of difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the quest for security. The absence of this threat would be the absence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as well. Security is only needed where there is a threat. If a threat is not perceived, if one believes oneself invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for those who can be damaged. Does America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of one’s own vulnerability, then security can only be found in the acknowledgment of one’s threatened condition, and this means that it can only be found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, **all of the planned securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek**. Security requires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers.As preservers, what we are charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to not challenge it forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment. That we participate in this essencing of being does not make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name this the clearing of the truth (Wahrheit) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (bewahrt). When a thing truthfully is, when it is what it is in truth, then it is preserved. In preserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror. Dasein is not innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish terrorism. For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree willful. **This will can only impose itself upon being**, can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never-ending supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true security can only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is precisely when we are busy with security measures and the frantic organization of resources that we directly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest. In the notes to the “Evening Conversation,” security is thought in just such terms: Security (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this; security resides in rest [in der Ruhe] and is itself made superfluous by this. (GA 77: 244)23 The rest in question is a rest from the economic cycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of total war, is precisely the era of restlessness (“The term ‘totality’ says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into the ‘restless’” [GA 69: 181]). Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of the useless. Utility and function are precisely the dangers of a t°xnh that has turned antagonistic towards nature. In rest, they no longer determine the being of the thing. In resting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are preserved. There is no security; this is what we have to preserve. Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls “the between” (das Zwischen). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security cannot do away with the threat, rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. **What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism and for terrorists**. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what is has already been destroyed. **Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point**. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. *If being is to terrorize*—if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism—then being must call for terrorists. They are simply more “slaves of the history of beyng” (GA 69: 209) and, in Heidegger’s eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism. But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naïveté, we can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, “human resources” are no different from “livestock,” and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish.

# WOT ONTOLOGICAL REJECTION

### The affirmatives attempt to secure our world leads to an endless spiral of violence – only prioritizing ontology can remedy violence

**Zimmerman 1985**

Dept of philosophy at U of Colorado **1985** Michael Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives page 135-136

We live in an age of crisis. Crises threaten to destroy established states of affairs, but crises are also opportunities for creating something novel and beautiful. At first glance, it would appear that the nuclear arms race is the most pressing crisis facing us. Surely if this arms race ends like those before it, we will destroy much of humanity as well as many other forms of life that share the Earth with us. The nuclear arms race, however, as I shall argue in the following essay, may only be a symptom of a deeper crisis that has been developing for many centuries. This crisis has to do with how we understand ourselves as human beings. Today, human beings in the so-called developed countries regard humankind as the center of reality, the source of all meaning, and the only beings with intrinsic value. I shall use the term “anthropocentric humanism” to refer to this way of understanding who we are. The dark side of humanism is often ignored in favor of the positive dimensions of the humanism with which we are more familiar. The positive thrust of humanism includes its recognition of the importance of individual human freedom and its affirmation of the dignity of humankinds. The dark side of humanism involves an arrogant human-centeredness that reduces the nonhuman world to the status of a commodity whose only value lies in its usefulness for human purposes. According to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, conceiving of ourselves as masters of all beings, we adopt a false sense of superiority that undermines our true humanity. In the following essay, which will make use of some of Heidegger’s thoughts about human existence in the nuclear age, I argue that this same drive to dominate the natural world is present in the armed struggle between nations. The current nuclear arms race can be interpreted as a conflict between two great representatives of anthropocentric humanism, the United States and the Soviet Union. Strangely, each nation is prepared to annihilate the other side in order to defend the principles of “true humanism”. Marxists and capitalist alike regard their life as the only legitimate fulfillment of the Enlightenment ideal of human progress and freedom. But to a large extent both superpowers are guided by anthropocentric humanism, whose highest aim is power and security, Hence, neither superpower can rest content until the other side is eliminated or at least neutralized. Paradoxically, the quest for total security leads to total insecurity, as we are finding out now that the nuclear arms race is moving to even more threatening levels. In my view, the dangers of nuclear war will not be eliminated, even though some arms controls might be successfully negotiated, until there occurs a basic shift in our understanding of what it means to be human. The positive side of humanism, which has some insight into what it means to be fully human, points in the right direction, but the dark of anthropocentric side predominates today. Let us consider for a moment Heidegger’s view that anthropocentric humanism is the underling disorder, of which the nuclear arms race is but a particularly dangerous symptom.

# WOT IMPACTS – GLOBAL VIOLENCE

**U.S. national security team inspects communication between peoples and manipulates the network warfare to encourage a discourse of terrorism by the public for unquestioned brutal US policy.**

**Der Derian, 2013**

Research Professor of International Relations [James, Brown University, Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, “Social Science Research Council / After September 11”, 2002,<http://essays.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/der_derian_text_only.htm>, accessed 8/1/13]

With information as the life-blood and speed as the killer variable of networks, getting inside the decision-making as well the image-making loop of the opponent became the central strategy of network warfare. This was not lost on the U.S. national security team as it struggled after the initial attack to get ahead of the network curve.Sluggish reactions were followed by quicker pre-emptive actions on multiple networks.The Senate passed the Uniting and Strengthening America (USA) Act, which allowed for roving wiretaps of multiple telephones, easier surveillance of e-mail and Internet traffic, and the divulgence of grand jury and wiretap transcripts to intelligence agencies. National Security adviser Condoleeza Rice made personal calls to heads of the television networks, asking them to pre-screen and to consider editing Al Qaeda videos for possible coded messages.Information about the air campaign as well as the unfolding ground interventions were heavily filtered by the Pentagon.Information flows slowed to a trickle from the White House and the Defense Department after harsh words and tough restrictions were imposed against leaks.Psychological operations were piggy-backed onto humanitarian interventions by the dropping of propaganda leaflets and food packs.The Voice of America began broadcasting anti-Taliban messages in Pashto. After the 22 Most Wanted Terrorists were featured on the FBI’s website, the popular TV program America’s Most Wanted ran an extended program on their individual cases.Some of the most powerful networks are often the least visible, but when you add Hollywood to the mix, it’s hard to keep a secret.The entertainment industry journal *Variety*first broke the news about a meeting between White House officials and Hollywood executives.The stated intention was ominous enough, to enlist Hollywood in the war effort:¶The White House is asking Hollywood to rally 'round the flag in a style reminiscent of the early days of World War II. Network heads and studio chiefs heard that message Wednesday in a closed-door meeting with emissaries from the Bush administration in Beverly Hills, and committed themselves to new initiatives in support of the war on terrorism. These initiatives would stress efforts to enhance the perception of America around the world, to "get out the message" on the fight against terrorism and to mobilize existing resources, such as satellites and cable, to foster better global understanding.12¶ Although some big media picked up this aspect of the story, none except for*Newsweek*took note of an earlier meeting organized by the military and the University of Southern Californiaâ€™s Institute for Creative Technology.13I knew about the ICT because I had covered its opening for*Wired*back in 1999, when the Army ponied up $43 million to bring together the simulation talents of Hollywood, Silicon Valley, and the U.S. military.14Now it seemed that they were gathering top talent to help coordinate a new virtual war effort:¶ In a reversal of roles, government intelligence specialists have been secretly soliciting terrorist scenarios from top Hollywood filmmakers and writers. A unique ad hoc working group convened at USC just last week at the behest of the U.S. Army. The goal was to brainstorm about possible terrorist targets and schemes in America and to offer solutions to those threats, in light of the twin assaults on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Among those in the working group based at USC's Institute for Creative Technology are those with obvious connections to the terrorist pic milieu, like "Die Hard" screenwriter Steven E. De Souza, TV writer David Engelbach ("MacGyver") and helmer Joseph Zito, who directed the features "Delta Force One," "Missing in Action" and "The Abduction."But the list also includes more mainstream suspense helmers like David Fincher ("Fight Club"), Spike Jonze ("Being John Malkovich"), Randal Kleiser ("Grease") and Mary Lambert ("The In Crowd") as well as feature screenwriters Paul De Meo and Danny Bilson ("The Rocketeer").15

# WOT IS TOTAL WAR

### Terrorism has changed geopolitics, the old program of rogue states has been replaced with the dangerous other lurking at every corner. All states are now rogue states as the unequivocal right to defend against terrorism has mobilized a new total war.

**Caputo 2003**

(WITHOUT SOVEREIGNTY, WITHOUT BEING: UNCONDITIONALITY, THE COMING GOD AND DERRIDA’S DEMOCRACY TO COME Extracts of this article have previously been published in France Today, the Journal of French Travel and Culture, <http://www.francetoday.com/>.)

This is not just abstract theory. This is all about September 11, all about politics today. During the cold war, things were maximally dangerous but perfectly clear. Two large sovereign superpowers guided by the “MAD” logic of “mutual assured destruction” kept each other more or less in check. Occasionally, most notably in the Cuban missile crisis, we stared into the abyss. But for the most part, sovereign nations guided by self-interest are not suicidal and it proved to be in the best interests of each to respect the space of the other. This absurdist logic worked and produced a simulacrum of peace, a lack of war that seemed at times almost as much like war as peace. When the cold war ended, things became more complicated, but no less dangerous, its place taken by the war on international terrorism, and on what “we” call the “rogue states” that finance, support and harbor terrorists. Not a war between superpowers, but between the respectable, legitimate states that respect international law (the true and the good) and the evil empire, the axis of evil, the “rogues,” the outlaws, the hooligans, who have no respect for law or life, “MAD” now having given way to “WMD” (concealed “weapons of mass destruction”)

Or so it seemed. September 11, 2001 shattered that illusion. With the collapse of the twin towers, the whole facade of a “war” on rogue “states” also collapsed. Now it is clear that the “enemy” is no longer an identifiable “state” with diplomats and a capital city, but elusive bands of faceless, stateless terrorists willing to sacrifice their lives to take out large buildings, the Pentagon and the White House itself, and to poison or kill countless numbers of innocent people in large cities with suicidal stealth. The classical concepts of war too had fallen. The collapse of the towers exposes the deeper anxiety that simmers beneath the bravado of a “war” on the “rogue states.” The second Gulf War was an effective way to prop up that illusion—Derrida wrote this book in 2002, before the war—not to mention to enhance the standing with the people for a president seeking re-election in a coming presidential campaign. But the cold truth is, after the end of the cold war, the rogue states are not *states* (V, 148-151, 212-14; PTT, 98, 101, 110-11). They are faceless terrorists hiding who knows where, in disguise, somewhere in Somalia, say, and a thousand other places, and if they get their hands on weapons of mass destruction, ones that they can conceal on their person, or in a vehicle, God help us all. We knew where Moscow was and we could train our missiles on the precise place, but we do not know who or where these people are. But by the same token, the legitimate states are precisely the ones who assert their sovereign and unilateral right to act in their own interests.

As Bill Clinton said in his 1993 address to the United Nations, the United States will act multilaterally when possible, but unilaterally when necessary (V, 147), whether or not we have the authorization of the UN General Assembly or even the Security Council, which we can usually control, whether or not we are in defiance of international law or human rights. But that is precisely what one means by an outlaw state, with no respect for international law, that is, a rogue state. Derrida says, “So there are no longer any rogue states and there are only rogue states” (V, 150)—that is, the rogues are not states, and the states are rogues (by exercising sovereignty, the self-styled legitimate states behave like rogues). Being a rogue is built right into being sovereign; it is pretty much what one means by a rogue state (V, 214). There are more rogues than you think, the USA first, then the UK, then France, if you just count how many times these sovereign states exercised their veto power in the Security Council on behalf of their national–sovereign–interests. The powers that be, the *exousiai*, that shaped the United Nations saw to it that the UN is another one of those democracies that has immunized itself against democracy. It has done this by establishing a Security Council whose principal function is to insure the security of the most powerful few against the democratic many in the General Assembly. The Security Council serves to secure the sovereignty of the five permanent members. Why just those five? Because they were winners of the last world war. Might makes right. The strongest reason, la raison du plus fort, prevails, not the strongest reason.

# WOT DISCOURSE BAD

### The Political uses terrorism to otherize and exclude the social minority in attempts to create an enemy

Nimmer 2007

Livio. Master Student at University of Tartu. [“DE-CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE TERRORISM DISCOURSE: A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST VIEW” www.ksk.edu.ee/wp.../KVUOA\_Toimetised\_14\_10\_livio\_nimmer.pdf ‎

There is further evidence that same kind of unclear criteria is used by US and UK police and juridical institutions to target people at their homeland.7 In this essay I will analyze from the social constructionist perspective the language used to describe terrorists and terrorism in terrorism discourse. The first part of the essay provides a short description of what I consider to be the mainstream view of terrorism. In the post 9/11 terrorism discourse, terrorism is often described as something new and unfamiliar. The word terrorism sig- nifies phenomena perceived as something demonic and ultimately barbaric. It is constantly used to refer to something as inherently evil, irrational and completely unjustified. Terrorism is described as an uncivilized way for some social actors to advance their irrational goals. Terrorism as a tactic is usually described as unsuccessful. As such terrorism is depicted as senseless and irrational use of violence against innocent victims. I will contest the mainstream view of terrorism from the social con- structionist viewpoint. Social constructionism presumes that our reality is constituted by the constant and dynamic interaction between individuals and institutions. Our worldview is ““constructed””, that is, determined by the language that we use in the interaction process. Our and our adversaries’’ identities are created through the use of language. As language is infused and intermingled with power, and thus, political, social actors who strive for power always try to normalize their worldview at the expense of excluding others’’ worldviews. In public discourse the language of terrorism is often utilized to construct the evil ““other””. From a social constructionist viewpoint the word ““terrorism”” is a construction; there are no universal and objective standards of what terrorism is and who terrorists are. Rather the word is often used to delegitimatize the position of those who are not part of dominant social groups. In the final part I will use the concept of de-contextualization from lit- erary theory to describe the discursive strategy used to label enemies. In terrorism discourse terrorists are demonized through the process of de- contextualization. With the help of de-contextualization terrorism is projected in public discourse as a metaphysical phenomenon. The consequences of this process are that when terrorism is perceived as being metaphysical it can generate an atmosphere of anxiety which serves as fertile ground for attempts to de-legitimatize political dissent and activism.

# WOT DISCOURSE BAD

### Social Discourse has made the orthodox view of terrorism common sense further pushing “the labeled” into violence and exclusion

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“Why do they hate us?”” was the questions many were asking in the West, and particularly in US, after the attacks of 9/11. Soon afterward, the consen- sus was, at first, that it must be because of the failure of the Arab world to come to terms with modernity. As put by one professor of US National War College, the root cause for the anger towards the West was the historic failure of the Arab world to embrace the achievements of modernity: democracy, capitalism and science.8 Huntingtoinian prophecy had fulfilled itself.9 A simi- lar but more generalized idea was aptly put forward by US president George W. Bush.10 The moral condemnation of the 9/11 terrorist acts was unequivo- cal in the US. In the post 9/11 public discourse now emerged a dominant understanding that word terrorism designated something inherently evil and morally wrong. It is often argued that terrorism is immoral at all times in all places, and that terrorism is essentially always the same irrespective of the context it emerges from. The consequence of the 9/11 is that the question of ““terrorism”” is seen in rigid, morally absolute categories. One must condemn terrorism, or it is clear that one embraces it. In the years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, in public discourse, the conceptualization of terrorism has taken a specific ““common sense”” form. There is a general assumption that only one and universal way of con- ceptualizing terrorism exists. This view has become dominant in western thought. I will call it the orthodox view of terrorism. Over the years the ortho- dox view of terrorism has shaped both –– public discourse and policy –– mak- ing it perceived as objective and universal. Yet contrary to this mainstream view there are other ways to conceptualize terrorism. What we classify as terrorism, and who we label as terrorists depends largely on the point of view from which we approach the question. After the attacks on the World Trade Center –– but also in response to some earlier attacks –– a vivid but very oversimplified conventional wisdom has developed about contemporary terrorism that portrays this threat as both new and unfamiliar.11 In orthodox view, terrorism is broadly defined as the use of violence by non-state actors against innocent non-combatants. Even though there are probably as many definitions of terrorism as there are authors writing about the subject, generally the orthodox view tends to mirror definitions proposed by the US Department of State and US Department of Defense. The US Department of State definition states: ““the term terrorism means pre- meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience””. The Department of State definition has been in use since 1983 and the US Department of Defense has expanded on this with a more recent definition, according to which terrorism is ““The unlawful use of –– or threatened use of –– force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives””.12 There is a latent presumption in both definitions that it is only non-state actors who can commit acts of terrorism. The latter one also introduces religion and the vague ““ideological objectives”” as motivators for terrorism. The notion ““ideological objectives”” is specifically vague and could facilitate a wide range of possible interpretations of motives that cause social actors to commit acts of violence. The orthodox view describes modern terrorist’’s mentality as growing from absolutist and religiously motivated worldview which sees everything in binary categories: either-or, good or evil, us or them. That is why there is no possible way to come to a rational compromise or no possibility of dialogue or mutual bargaining between the sides. Peaceful and civilized dialogue and persuasion of terrorists is not possible because of their absolutist and rigid principles. Thus the proposed solution to deal with the problems that terrorism presents is to implement rigid and absolutist countermeasures against those who are classified as terrorists. Those who commit terrorist acts are, accord- ing to orthodox view, enemies of the democratic process and civilized dis- course itself. Terrorists are described as inherently evil and uncivilized.13 In the orthodox view terrorist mentality is usually portrayed as unwarrantably radical and irrational in its core; terrorists are simply nihilists who are driven by abstract ““cruelty and hate, the shedding of all moral restraints, the great rage about everything and nothing in particular, the joy generated by killing and destruction””14. Terrorist acts are described as irrational not only because of their non- sensible motives, but also because their acts are directed against a tendency of rational human beings to strive for order and stability. As terrorists intimidate and destabilize societies by disseminating fear, uncertainty, insecurity and chaos they are described as enemies of the principle of order itself. Their tactics rely on generating shock, fear and surprise in societies, which strive for order and predictability, by indiscriminately attacking innocents. Moreover, according to the orthodox view, modern terrorists show a special kind merci- lessness by using any means possible –– including the possible use of weapons of mass destruction –– to advance their agenda against victimized societies. In the orthodox view the terrorist threat is often portrayed as an amorphous and fluid menace, and terrorists as an invisible a-spatial enemy. Terrorist are stateless and without territory, operating in the form of terrorist networks that transcend the borders of states.15

# WOT DISCOURSE BAD

### The societal discourse of terrorism creates a constant state of fear, panic, and anxiety that intensifies negative/irrational political action

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The consequence of de-contextualisation in the terrorism discourse is that when the enemy is constructed as an abstract evil it creates an atmosphere of public anxiety and fear. For example during the eight years of the US Home- land Security Advisory System –– a five-color scheme that indicated the ter- rorist threat in the US –– it was mostly on levels yellow or orange, fluctuating between high and elevated levels of threat. It was never lowered to blue or green.46 By de-contextualization an atemporal and omnipresent state of emer- gency is created that manufactures need to be ever vigilant, and implement ever widening scope of terrorism countermeasures like electronic surveil- lance, wiretapping, personal information harvesting, border searches and racial profiling.47 The image of an invisible and aspatial enemy that poses an omnipresent threat opens up the possibility of resolving arbitrarily the problem of nam- ing the enemy. In the state of public fear scapegoating as enemies those who look different, who have alternative political views, or who constitute mar- ginalized groups in society, could become a normal and tolerated practice. In the state of anxiety the practice of labelling and scapegoating different social actors becomes the means for satisfying certain socialand psychologi- cal needs, like the need to assign blame or the need to reduce the psychic discomfort of society.48 There is a danger that terrorism discourse leads to persecution of political dissent and to the destruction of open civil society. The war on terrorism is not limited to violent extremism, but is fought against ““extremist ideology”” in general. This ““extremist ideology”” is shared alike by those who commit acts of violence and those who are called ““non-violent extremists””.49 When terrorist motives are de-contextualized, those who are blamed for supporting terrorists or sharing a terrorist philosophy are also classified under a category of ““terrorist””.50 It is not only certain actions but also certain ways of thinking that are delegitimatized in the terrorism discourse. There is a growing body of evidence that political activists, animal rights protesters, anti-globalism protesters, liberals, academics, and curiously even photographers are silenced and persecuted under the legislation that has proliferated as a consequence of terrorism discourse.51 The de-contextualization of the enemy leads to the legislation that in broad sweeps makes a large variety of political expression a terrorism related offense. In the US Patriot Act, for example, a new concept of domestic terrorism is coined, that is defined as ““acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws”” if they ““appear to be intended ... to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion””52. Such vaguely defined criteria make it possible to classify almost any kind of politi- cal expression as terrorism. A similar problem is present in the inclusion of ideological and religious motives in official definitions of terrorism. Commu- nicatingone’’s political or religious views is part of normal democratic public life. But by making it possible to classify advancing ones religious or political views, and influencing government politics as terrorism-related crime, gov- ernments could limit legitimate political action as they see fit. Itis not only radical forms of political actions like property damage or civil disobedience that are vilified, but in a state of public fear, any critique of dominant power is dampened.

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

**The quest to produce a grounds for who counts in democracy is exactly what makes democracy impossible. The struggling of who counts if solidified to make democracy exist always produces a new outside to be accounted for.**

Schmidt 08

(Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

This lack of foundation stands in sharp contrast to the traditional philosophical project of providing a foundation for the just ␣␣␣␣␣. Plato is the first, but certainly not the last, to argue that the proper foundation of the just ␣␣␣␣␣ is truth and that, as the one who can distinguish truth from opinion, the philosopher should be king.21 In making this argument one sees how philosophers who regard themselves as the monarchs of truth tend to set themselves in opposition to the very notion of democracy. Arendt refers to this philosophical tendency to found political life upon a conception of truth as “the tyranny of truth.” This tendency to link the foundations of political life with truth is also the reason that philosophers often regard the task of government as educating its citizens. One sees this clearly in Plato’s remarks that “a polity is a thing which nurtures men, good men when it is noble, bad men when it is base.”22 So long as philosophy is conceived as a matter of foundations, or one might say that so long as philosophy remains metaphysically invested in grounds—in knowing them, producing them, identifying them—it will only find it difficult to grasp the nature of democracy.23 In Greece, democracy emerged as a form of consensus prior to any struggle, the consensus to negotiate the movements of power in the ␣␣␣␣␣ by the simple process of counting. It was designed to preserve the movement of power and the freedom of those who participated in the ␣␣␣␣␣ to try to influence that movement. But one sees then that the word “democracy” is itself full of con- sequence; simple counting was never able to be a simple matter. Democracy is, in the end, a rather messy idea: never complete, always the site of contested claims, of self-critique as well as self-assertion. It is the refusal of a single vision. Plato was right to describe it as “a many-colored cloak decorated in all hues.” The Greek world that coined this word soon learned that this was the case. The questions that follow as soon as one reflects upon its elements—upon the idea of the people and the idea of power—open the notion of democracy as a complex one, indeed as one necessarily incomplete and, in some sense, impossible. This means that in every reality, every form it assumes in any present, democracy will always remain as much a matter of promise as of that existing reality.

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

The potential for democracy to open itself to a overturning of power is found at the heart of democracy itself. The inside and outside of the demos is tied to the overturning as the outside must be welcomed in. Democracy’s that do not do this are a form of self-effacment that reduces the world to calculation.

Schmidt 08 (Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

Incomplete and impossible though it may be, the richness and openness spoken of in the word “democracy” has given it a long life and has let it serve as an inspiration in many political movements. As a promise it points easily to a new future and so readily lends itself to reform and even revolutionary movements. As always incomplete, democracy requires its own persistent reinvention. And yet, despite its enduring charm, despite its constant promise, it is also the case that one finds arguments today that democracy is inadequate to the needs of our times, that the nature of the public realm has so fundamentally changed that something new is needed to match the challenges of that world. One sees such a claim, for instance, in Heidegger’s remark that “for me, it is a decisive question just how a political system—and which system—can be accommodated to the contemporary technical era. I do not know an answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy.”25 Is such a remark simply the reflection of an undemocratic prejudice—whether that prejudice is rooted in Heidegger’s own personal views or in the tendency of philosophy to resist the notion of democracy (or both)—or does it raise an important question about the sufficiency or capacity of democracy to measure up to the task of today?

The contention driving such a claim is not that a democratic state cannot exist in a technologically advanced state. Such a claim would simply be false and without any basis. Rather, the contention is that the space of political life, the realm of the common, has been changed in such a way that we now find ourselves confronting power in new forms, forms that are not flexible and that do not submit themselves to anything like the turnover of power that is so basic to the democratic process in which inside and outside must be able to trade places. The argument is that in the present globalized age technological reason and its structures and institutions have imposed a new logic of power, one that has no outside. It is this totalization of power, this totalitarian condition, that leads Heidegger to refer to our age as a time of “extreme distress” and as the “beginning of the lack of history,”26 that is, as the inauguration of a time in which power will not take different forms. One might say that ours is an age in which power will not turnover, that is, it will not submit itself to the transfer at the heart of the democratic process. Rather, this is a time in which power empowers and preserves itself and that signals the closure of the space of political life, the closure of the space of decision.

Heidegger’s argument is that, in the age determined by technological reason and its global expansion, “everything is encased in the security of a path which is planned and exact and steerable, and which masters everything.”27 This, then, is the time of the triumph of calculation and an equalization of all things. This means as well that this is equally the time of the disappearance of the other of what can be counted and calculated, namely, the singularity of the individual who cannot be reduced to an abstract number, the singularity in which freedom resides. Heidegger gives two names to the character of that which defines our epoch. The first name is Machenschaft; the second name is Gestell. Both of these designations of the essential character of our times are attempts to give a name to the force that has colonized the space of all appearances, including the space called the ␣␣␣␣␣, that space in which alone we can appear both as subjects and as citizens, the space of the common and the struggle for it. To speak of Machenschaft and Gestell is to suggest that these forces now define the conditions of appearance—above all as a matter of calculability—and, equally, the shape of power as that which we cannot control but which controls and defines us. “What does Machenschaft mean? That which is set free into its own chains. Which chains? The schema of thoroughly calculable explainability through which everything draws closer to everything else and becomes thoroughly alien to itself, indeed becomes completely other than what is simply alien.”28

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Terrorism is the result of this solidification of politics. Exclusion from all encompassing rational order leaves only the unreason in the form of raw violence. Terrorism is the means by which the individual re-inserts into a political where they do not count. Making democracy calculable simultaneously effaces it.

Schmidt 2008

(Dennis J. Schmidt Who Counts? On Democracy, Power, and the Incalculable Research in Phenomenology 38 (2008) 228–243)

In place of any possible sovereign power, today we find the final possible alternative to the present shape of power. What is left as such an alternative is the power of individuals who stand completely apart from sovereignty and the turnover of power. We call such individuals “terrorists”—those whose power is terrible, terrifying, and monstrous—simply because the form of the power they express is outside that which has no outside. What is left, what is expressed by such power, is the assertion of unreason and real powerlessness in the form of the individual.30 What is left is irrational, incalculable, inefficient, non- sense. Such is the only remaining outside of power, and so long as there are no alternatives, such explosive expressions of powerlessness will not cease. Efforts to step outside the static tyranny of the new form of power as it is figured by globalized technology will always have something of desperation about them, something of nihilism, since it is a form of power that will not turn itself over. When the locus of power is no longer able to be contested, when power has calcified and become total leaving no alternative political power, then simple violence, naked brutality, is all that remains as a means of contesting the established power. There has always been political brutality and unspeakable violence; our age did not invent terror and horror. But our age has witnessed an intensification of certain dimensions of violence, an intensification changing the landscape of every exercise of power and turning the attempt to contest power into violence of a new order: open, public spaces can now be dangerous, no one is considered innocent, children have become weapons as well as targets, strangers are threatening, the material shapes of everyday life— airplanes, envelopes, shoes—are turned back upon individuals as weapons. Sovereign nations are not attacked, individuals are attacked. In short, the old forms by which those in power were confronted and power was contested have taken a new form, namely the form of raw violence, and the reason for this is that the power in power is itself a fundamentally new form. Or, so Heidegger would argue.

In the Greek world of its beginnings, democracy rested upon two sets of necessary conditions. The first of these conditions took the form of a prior agreement, the consent of all who would be citizens, to abide by the rule of the majority. This condition is met by individuals prior to any sense that there is a ␣␣␣␣␣. It is something of a pledge in which each person agrees to abide by a count, by numbers, that has yet to be tabulated. The second of the conditions requisite for democracy is, as Aristotle argued, the freedom of every individual, the absence of any coercion in matters of the democratic process, in the voice one has, and equally, the equality of all individuals when it comes to the matter of counting.31 These conditions are, of course, at odds: the first requires that each citizen be recognized as a singular being, an end unto him/herself, the second requires a reduction of each citizen to an abstract equality in which no one is different. If Heidegger’s claims about the present historical juncture are right, if we do indeed live in an age in which a sort of reduction to what is calculable is definitive, an age in which singularity is effaced, if not erased, then one can see how it is that the conditions of democratic life are in jeopardy. Despite the glaring inequities in the world, a curious equalization of everyone as an abstraction, as a simple number, is being achieved today, and at the same time, the singularity that is the locus of freedom seems more than ever to be alienated. Facing a form of power that will not turn over, the source of which will not change, any people, all peoples, seem to be in the strange condition of being outsiders.

If Heidegger’s argument about the nature of technological reason, the Gestell and Machenschaft, is right, then **the possibilities of democracy in our time must indeed be considered in the light of the challenges of technological reason and the globalization that such rationality makes possible**. Above all, one must ask how it is that we can preserve—or perhaps recover—**an openness permitting the appearance of individuals in their singularity, that is, in their difference from others**. One must also ask, just as urgently, **how it is that power can transfer itself and not be calcified into one form.** In other words, **how it might be possible for history to begin again.** Heidegger expressed a sense of helplessness before this question: “only a god can save us,” he said.32 That comment is not a declaration of faith; it is rather a statement of despair and hopelessness: we are powerless, only an outside, something beyond our understanding, can introduce change and set history into motion anew. It is not difficult to see the reasons for such a claim: **globalization has, by virtue of the technologies that drive it and render it possible, shown itself to be a homogenization of the world and a shrinking of the spaces of political life, the spaces, that is, of differences.** Nonetheless, **one can still ask if this totalization and closure of the space of political life is indeed so seamless.**

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Terrorism is the foremost concern for geopolitics today. Our context is only thinkable with terrorism. The west’s construction of the other structures democracy so as to be a violent containment of similarity reducing the other to enemy.

**Kuswa and Walsh 2007**

(Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Toward unraveling this idea, we will move through three sections: a con- textual assessment of democracy in an era of conflict and terrorism, a detour through two of John Dewey’s contributions related to politics and pedagogy, and a quest for a non-mediating rhetoric that can translate “anti-war” politics into a space for unconditional encounters with the Other.a The first section dives into the context of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and the formation of new stereotypes, new geopolitical divisions, and an ever-evolving clash of cultures. What does it mean to live in an era of terrorism? Looking at how terrorism defines much of our current location in history must remain on the agenda, for the methods and practices of democracy are now tied up in the knots of violence, security, and the false binary between an American citizen- ship and the meaning of the West’s Other. Terrorism is not simply about the United States’ conception of stateless violence, despite what policy-makers will declare, even though the constructed nature of the binary that divides “with us” from “against us” means that everyone is implicated in the way the United States draws lines between friends and enemies.

The second section will introduce a little-known passage by John Dewey that calls for the “abolition of war.” By way of exploring the possibilities of Dewey’s romantic message, we then turn to the evolution of critical pedagogy where we find, unfortunately, a number of idealistic and abstract insights, often appearing as simple appeals to tolerance and understanding. In spe- cific contexts, though, most notably moments when the concept of terrorism intersects argumentation, the need for a utopian space informed by the tenets of critical pedagogy is acute. Answering Dewey’s call for an open-ended criti- cal pedagogy that works to isolate and reject the rush to “mediating rhetoric” (Zulaika & Douglass, 1996), the third and final section will argue that an effective and radical democracy must carve out spaces free from threat projections and unquestioned representations. When depictions of the Other are dehumanizing and pre-committed to certain judgments, the consequence is a democracy of containment that thrives on enemy-creation and acts to block the possibility of sincere and expressive engagements between selves and Others.

Confronting War and Terror, Past and Present

We begin with an attempt to contextualize what democracy means, or could mean, during a time marked by the United States government’s particular ways of pursuing a war on terrorism. On the other hand, there are very practical limits to any writing about democracy and education, let alone a journal article written in an academic voice for an academic audience. Despite these limits (restricted audience, resources, means of organizing direct action), deliberation regarding theories of education is still an important site for change. Indeed, education represents an intersection between thinking about terrorism and policies governing terrorism (Wells, 2003).

An example of a scholar contributing to critical theory as praxis, Henry Giroux published two articles in 2006 (2006a, 2006b) that stress the need for critical pedagogy in the face of the global war on terror. His general position is that the way counter-terrorism is practiced threatens to erase all of our civil liberties and could kill democracy in an attempt to save it. Giroux heightens his impact by drawing on the increasingly common contention that state control in the United States is chilling academic freedom and criticism of official policy. Wiretapping and surveillance are the cusp of unimpeded police powers and profiling that includes many groups within the academic community. To be fair, though, Giroux’s work should not be exempt from the requirement to present an alternative. In other words, what are the specific theories or reforms available and how can they be applied in direct and meaningful ways?

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Terrorism is not stable either. Does a act of political violence make someone a terrorist? One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Rigid determinations of political legitimacy become more problematic as the dangerous other is though to be everywhere and the solution is exermination.

**Kuswa and Walsh 2007**

(Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Audrey Kirth Cronin (2003, 32) discusses the difficulties in trying to define terrorism and responses to it, commenting that terrorism is especially difficult to pinpoint because the term has “evolved and...because it is associ- ated with an activity that is designed to be subjective.” Cronin asserts that the targets of terrorism are not only, or even primarily, the victims who are killed or harmed in the attacks. The secondary and perhaps more signifi- cant targets are “the governments, publics, or constituents among whom the terrorists hope to engender a reaction—such as fear, repulsion, intimidation, overreaction, or radicalization” (Cronin, 2003, 32).d Terrorism is a matter of perception and can be interpreted differently, making rigid determinations of “us” and “them” even more pernicious. Like much of the information about al Qaeda, overt and omnipresent, Cold War propaganda infused all areas of life, including school textbooks and literature selected for school readings. Shaw writes: “Was all culture, on both sides of the Cold War, merely an extension of politics? If so, how could this alter our perception of the conflict?” (2001, 61) In other words, how does a national culture portray an enemy or a conflict in terms of a necessary solution? What solution fits the harm? If the problem is everywhere, or at least could be anywhere, the appropriate solution is more likely to be a sweeping purge and less consistent with democratic principles. This is not a defense of today’s means of implementing democracy—the practices of so-called democratic nations—but a defense of the possibility of democracy, the promise of an idea, a Derridean gesture to the need for the impossible. “I continue to believe that it is faith in the possibility of this impossible...that must govern all of our decisions” (Derrida, 2003, 115).

In a provocative interview, Derrida speaks about the significance of 9/11 as a major event, hinting that the horror of the attack itself was also its literal hijacking of the future, its announcement that there could be an even bigger event—that the worst has yet to come. Derrida says, “Traumatism is pro- duced by the future, by the to come, by the threat of the worst to come” (2003, 97). Interestingly, the concept of the “possible impossible,” or the future that is yet to come, is also Derrida’s defense of democracy later in the same inter- view. To explain further, Derrida is not apologizing for democracy’s failures and defending the existing array of liberal democratic states in the world; on the contrary, he is imagining a demo-cracy. This demo-cracy, perhaps a utopia,e should be for and by the people as well as poised toward a future of furthering justice through law. ‘Democracy to come’ does not mean a future democracy that will one day be ‘present.’ Democracy will never exist in the present; it is not presentable, and it is not a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. But there is the impossible, whose promise democracy inscribes—a promise that risks and must always risk being perverted into a threat. (130)

Moreover, the promises of democracy, let alone its implementation, are as diverse as they are contradictory. Here we adopt a view of (radical) democracy as an unreachable condition of universal human rights with no entry require- ment other than being human. Derrida is reluctant to commit to terms like “citizenship” or “human rights” even though he eventually uses these concepts to articulate the possibilities for rethinking “the political” and moving beyond the trappings of national sovereignty.

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Democracy itself becomes targeted as it gives rise to the very instances of violence it assumes to exclude.

Haddad 2004

(Derrida and Democracy at Risk Contretemps 4, September 2004 http://sydney.edu.au/contretemps/4september2004/haddad.pdf)

Thus the case of Algeria provides an example of the workings of auto-immunity in democracy (but to repeat a point I have already made, here and throughout “La Raison du Plus Fort” it is a question of the broader definition of auto-immunity, in which there is no explicit mention of democracy attacking its own defense system). A democracy makes possible the threat of an attack against itself from certain ‘othersʼ, and its response to this threat is to attack itself. A second example that Derrida uses to demonstrate the same kind of phenomenon is the event of the attacks of September 11:

[I]t is perhaps because the United States lives in a culture and according to a law largely democratic that it was able to open itself and expose its greatest vulnerability to immigrants, for example to apprentice pilots, “terrorists” experienced and themselves suicidal who, before turning against the others and also against themselves the very aerial bombs they became, before launching them in launching themselves against the two towers of the WTC, were trained on the sovereign territory of the United States, under the nose of the CIA and the FBI, perhaps not without some auto-immune consent from an Administration at the same time more or less unforeseeing than one believes before a supposedly unforeseeable and major event.24

This example is of a slightly different nature to that of the Algerian elections, since it is not a question here of democracyʼs openness to a plurality of forms of government (which follows from its essential indetermination). Rather, the root of the problem lies more simply in democracyʼs openness to others, which is linked to the movement of universalization inherent in democracyʼs perfectibility. Derridaʼs claim is that the United States was being democratic in exposing itself to the threat that became September 11, through its relatively open borders and training of those who were to turn against it. Thus, in spite of the difference in the kind of openness involved, what is common to both September 11 and the Algerian elections is the fact that the threat can be seen to be arising as a possibility internal to democracy.

Further, there are strong parallels between these two cases regarding the location of the threat in a historical chain. In the case of September 11 there is a long history which could also be described as “a series of linked examples of an auto-immune pervertibility of democracy,” in which the troops trained by the United States to fight against what is seen to be the anti-democratic threat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan return to attack these same United States.25 This again has the consequence of making difficult any clear distinction between democracy and its ‘othersʼ, since these ‘othersʼ are in many ways the product of democracy itself. And here too this long history of auto-immunity also extends into the future. For after September 11

...we see an American administration... which, claiming to set off on a war against the ‘axis of evilʼ, against the enemies of liberty and against the assassins of democracy in the world, must inevitably and undeniably restrain, in its own country, the said democratic liberties or exercise of rights, through extending the powers of police inquisition, etc.26

The perceived threat to the democracy of the United States (this time in the form of the threat of attacks even worse than September 11) leads this democracy to attack a part of itself (the suspension of certain democratic rights and liberties) in order to ensure its survival. The United States attacks a part of itself in order to defend itself against attacks that are imagined to come in the future from a source imagined to be other and more dangerous than itself.

# WOT – IS ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

### Viewing the alternative as political re opens up sights of contestation that are foreclosed in a state centric model. The pushing of the boundaries of what qualifies as the political is the very basis for an agonistic democracy.

**Barnett 2004**

(Deconstructing radical democracy: articulation, representation and being-with- others. Political Geography, 23(5), pp. 503–528.)

In his recent manifesto for a revivified political geography, John Agnew (2002) sets out the case for engaging with issues of normative justification when conceptualising and researching political topics. One of the places to start this task, he suggests, is by considering the meaning of the category ‘political’ itself. It is a now commonplace to observe that politics refers to much more than a narrow range of practices such as periodic elections, political party activities, and the making of policy and legislation by government. Over the last four decades or so, the upsurge of new forms of politics, and the associated revival of interest in participatory theories of democracy, has had the effect of heightening the sense that there is an important distinction between what is ordinarily recognized as being routine politics on the one hand, and the activities that actually define what counts as routine politics in the first place on the other. One of the most important contributions of various new social movements has been to help redefine what counts as politics, by making visible new objects of public contention, as well as by developing new practices through which to pursue political objectives. One way of making this point is by distinguishing between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. The politics/political distinction is central to a range of post-war Continental political philosophy, including the work, amongst others, of Claude Lefort, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Jacques Ranciere. For Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy (1997, 99) invoking this distinction is a means for addressing what they call the “retreat of the political”, a phrase which has a double reference: firstly, it refers to the claim that the question of the meaning of the political withdraws when we just accept received understandings of politics; secondly, it refers to the claim that only by refusing this obviousness is the way opened up to re-treating the political in new ways. The substantialization of ‘the political’ is also a feature of writers such as Hannah Arendt and Sheldon Wolin, where it similarly marks an attempt “to recall us from the habitual forms to the substance of the political” (Pitkin 1972, 213). In all of these writers, the distinction is meant to express the sense that politics exceeds its institutional formats (Arditi 2003, 308).

The distinction between politics and the political is particularly important in the development of theories of poststructuralist radical democracy and agonistic democracy by writers like Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), Bonnie Honig (1993), James Tully (1999), and William Connolly (1995). These approaches propose that the very essence of democratic politics lies in the constant contestation of the boundaries of ‘the political’. A key division within contemporary political theory is, then, between theories which see contestation as the ineradicable lifeblood of democracy, and which tend to be suspicious of overly rationalistic, institutionally-based definitions of democracy and justice; and theories which continue to emphasize the importance of defining procedures for arriving at agreement within which disputes and contestation can take place. Whereas John Rawls (1993), for example, delimits ‘the political’ as that set of political principles upon which all reasonable people would converge, and within which disagreement over comprehensive values can take place, theories of radical democracy tend to define the political as the realm of interminable conflict, contestation, and antagonism.The politics/political distinction has become particularly important in the interpretation of deconstruction as a variety of political theory**. In this paper, I want to question the predominant way of interpreting the conceptual distinction between politics and the political as it is applied to deconstruction. This is** the interpretation of politics/the political as analogous to Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic and the ontological**.**

# WOT – ALTERNATIVE IS TERRORIZE THINKING

### Furthermore, we must terrorize thinking itself in order to open political possibilies beyond status quo positivism

### Mitchell, 2005

### (Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, *Research in Phenomenology,* 35)

Insofar as it is Americanism that is identified with technological domination and the spread of the unworld, then it is no wonder that America is the place where the question of terrorism can and must be posed. Instead of turning from terror, we are called to respond to it. Not by sealing ourselves off from it in a single-minded deafness, but **by preserving the trace of being in its withdrawal**. America is distinct in this because America most faces the challenge of Americanism. America is today fighting the shadow of itself, it yearns to leap over its shadow and into a state of pure visibility and security. America is not faced with an outside aggressor, but with its own photographic negative in Americanism/terrorism. America’s challenge is to not recognize itself in Americanism and to preserve its difference from this ogre. For America to believe that it is the driving force behind Americanism is for America to believe that it is in control of being. Americanism is a movement of being; it is nothing “American.” America’s other is neither Greece nor Rome, but Americanism. America must distinguish itself from Americanism in order to confront Americanism as its ownmost other. Terror can teach us this and lead us to preserve what is our own.

Is this to say that we should remain forever terrorized? exist forever in a state of terror? Is this supposed to provide a solution to the problem of terrorism? Surely that would be an outrageous demand (arge Zumutung) to place upon thinking. The older man says the same thing about malevolence as a basic trait of being; it places an outrageous demand upon thinking. A first step away from the imposed convenience of Americanism might be heard in the words of the younger man, “That this should be easy, namely to think the essential, is also a demand which only arises from the spirit of devastation” (GA 77: 215). If we are to think the essential, to think what withdraws in concealment before the total availability of the unworld around us, then our thinking itself will have to change. **Thinking the essential, this is a thinking that we can never be done with, a thinking that is never to be accomplished, a thinking that concerns what can never be thought through**.

Rather than think from out of the spirit of devastation, we are called to let it into thought; not to think devastation, but to devastatedly think. **Thinking itself must be devastated and terrorized** if we are to think today. Such a thinking would attend to the uncommon nature of our present situation before the terrorist threat. If America is terrorized, then it is terrorized by Americanism. But Americanism is nothing more than an epoch of being; it is the withholding of being in its withdrawal from us. In the face of this withdrawal we are called to think. Perhaps this is possible nowhere other than America; perhaps this thinking itself will mark another beginning for America, an American thinking that would not be enslaved to a pragmatic and utilitarian metaphysics. To think in this other American manner would be to entertain a new relation to technology, what Heidegger calls in the Spiegel interview of 1966 an “explicit relationship” to technology and “to what is happening today and what has been underway for three centuries.”24 Is such a thinking possible? Could it ever arise in America? Heidegger answers the question directly:

This explicit relationship, do the Americans have it today? They do not have it either. They are still entangled in a thinking, pragmatism, that fosters technological operating and manipulating but simultaneously blocks the path toward a contemplation of what is characteristic of modern technology. In the meantime, attempts to break away from pragmatic-positivistic thinking are being made here and there in the USA.25

There are no guarantees that these attempts will succeed; their success does not require such guarantees. We must hope that in the name of homeland security we do not too obstinately squelch them.

# **WOT – ALTERNATIVE IS REIMAGINING POLITICS**

### Argumentative studies broadens our role as political actors. At the intersection of citizenship, law, and politics imagining a different relationship with terrorism marks a response to violent conceptualization of self’s and others.

**Kuswa and Walsh 2007**

(Arguing War in an Era of Terrorism: “Democracy to Come” and Critical Pedagogy Kevin Kuswa and Briann Walsh (CONTROVERSIA Volume 5 Issue 2 <http://www.idebate.org/resources/publications/controversia.php> )

Our argument updates the insights of critical pedagogy by re-thinking the way the Other is conceived during times of conflict. Most importantly, the emerging era of terrorism and security intensifies the importance of reinvig- orating our educational priorities, striving to achieve space for cultural difference and dissent, an interdisciplinary perspective, a critique of a polarized and pre-existing Other, and citizenship built on critical thinking. As might be expected, critical pedagogy comes full circle back to Derrida’s defense of democracy. Education is one place where opportunities are generated, conceivably the most significant place where citizenship, the law, the nation-state, and even the political are hatched and developed. Derrida, in a rare moment where he advocates political action, discusses a notion of democracy outside sovereignty, in a place where subjects are not pre-defined by citizenship, the law, the nation-state, or even world-citizenship. This move requires rethinking what politics is about, broadening our roles as teachers and students:

This is no small task...What I call ‘democracy to come ’ would go beyond the limits of cosmopolitanism, that is, of a world citizenship. It would be more in line with what lets singular beings (anyone)‘live together.’...That said, and because all of this will remain for some time out of reach, I believe that everything must be done to extend the privilege of citizen- ship in the world. (130)

To continue the necessary resuscitation of democracy in Derrida’s sense, a critical pedagogy in an era of conflict and terrorism demands another look. The aim of articulating a non-mediating rhetoric is to resist deployments of education that would craft an expansive and violent Other under the signs of security and counter-terrorism. Our argument ends and begins from the position that practices of critical pedagogy in an argumentation studies setting (“What is terrorism?”) mark a potential response to violence and a polarized Other. The stakes are large in that the underlying issue is how to address local and global strategies of fear, oppression, control, annihilation, and extermination. An open-ended critical pedagogy informed by Derrida’s concept of a “democracy to come” and Dewey’s advocacy of a politics “against war” can work toward expressive engagements between selves and Others. Our era of fear and war based on terrorism and counter-terrorism requires a vision of a radical, even if impossible, democracy. More specifically, the abandonment of war in certain instances becomes a call symbolizing the need to encounter the Other without judgment or mediating rhetoric, a critical connection to teaching and learning that argues war to transcend

# **WOT – ALTERNATIVE IS REIMAGINING POLITICS**

### Re-conceptualizing terrorism changes how politics can be understood. The application of thinking terrorism in democracy produces a politics that makes policy auto-immune to itself a counter policy that opens up new possibilities.

**Mcquillan 2008**

(Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the In order for politics to be thinkable there must be some moment at which thought moves over into politics. Now, one could pick at this opening sentence for some time, books could be written and research projects designed to interrogate whether it is true or not. Its truth or otherwise will certainly depend upon what one means here by 'politics' (twice and non-identically), 'thinkable', 'some moment', 'thought', 'moves over', and indeed 'into', none of this is without consequence for either deconstruction or truth. However, allow me momentarily to place my own opening sentence in inverted commas, as if it had been spoken by someone else and with the authority of a someone else. Allow me the considerable license of taking this quotation as axiomatic for what is to follow even if both you and I do not believe it as a statement of fact, or at least even if you and I do not quite believe it as a statement of fact because we are more than capable of acting upon it in good faith as if it were fact. Such a statement is a seduction to short-circuit thinking. It asks us not to look at it - do not question me, take me as 'read.' In this sentence, one can find a concentrated example of the logo-rhetorical illusion that is the predicate of politics, in which politics and thought separate themselves into conceptual spheres just as these spheres emerge from the mediated, supplatory conceptualisation in which thought and politics are inextricably bound one to the other. However, today I am in the mood to be seduced and there are ways in which one can, more or less, give oneself up strategically to such overtures. Imagine for a moment that both thought and politics were imaginable outside of mediation and that one followed the other as day follows night and that one could be translated into the other by some alchemical process. Then imagine the consequences of this for politics. If one were able to momentarily suspend all this disbelief (as if 'deconstruction' and centuries of politics had never happened) then we would find ourselves in the position of the policy maker. This is not a new position to be in but one that has a certain visibility today in the technocratic space of liberal democracies. Today, 'policy making' is out- sourced to so-called 'think tanks' where policy is formulated and road- tested on 'focus groups' before being adopted (or paid for) by political parties, diluting to taste.

'Policy' is one of those obscure words of the modern political lexicon; nothing could be more vague or less well understood than this term, which of course means that it is invoked ubiquitously without reflection. The basic assumption of policy, as an idea, is the logo-rhetorical illusion par excellence that theory translates (and is translate-able in principle) into practice. Policy then becomes law, as if the transmission of the law were itself a straightforward and transparent thing. One might laugh at such a naIve, 'un-deconstructed' notion, if it were not for the fact that this is how the world is run. The comedian Ken Dodd says of Freud's formulation of laughter as a release of psychic energy: 'the problem with Freud is that he never played the Glasgow Empire.' Equally, the problem with the deconstruction of policy might be that the White House has yet to open itself to a policy of deconstruction. I want to ask in this essay, what would such a policy or set of policies look like, if they were imaginable? This is not to suggest that, after his death, the writing of Derrida might give rise to a set of 'practical' political policies, as the texts of Marx and Lenin were 'read' as the biblical revelation of an onto-theo-politics. Rather, it is to accept Roland Barthes' caution that one cannot simply exclude oneself from the discourse of stupidity. 'I don't mean that one can't be innocent of it', he told Jean-Jacques Brochier in 1975, 'that would be bad faith, but one can't be innocent of it *simply .* .. In any case, stupidity's mode of being is triumph. One can do nothing against stupidity. One can only internalize it, take a small homeopathic dose of it - but not too much' (Barthes 1985, 224). Think of this then as a hypothesis, what analytic philosophy would call a thought experiment. It is certainly not a bid for interpretative rights to the text of Derrida or the political futures of deconstruction, whatever such a word continues to mean. I am also reminded here of another caution, that of Edward Said who had little time for what he called 'travelling theory' (Said 1994, 389 and Said 1991, 226-47), whereby specialization as a mode of professionalisation within the academy comes to serve the interests of policy makers. His complaint is against the professional production of specialists on the 'Orient' who sell their expertise to the government and media while having their appearance in the government or media affirm their expertise. While the very idea of 'policy' no doubt marks an important, and not easily dismissed, transformation in the arena of competency of both party politicians and academics, it calls out for deconstruction. That is a deconstruction of its very premises as the dialectical-complex and unholy alliance between the techno-scientific, global economy and the technocratic university of specialisation in relation to a mediatic space, which presents one through the explanation of the other in terms of pragmatism, expediency, compromise or 'realism'. Here I am talking about a certain culture that we call politics, the properly political (the discourse of parties and politicians in governmental power across the world). As Derrida points out in *Specters of Marx,* in this culture 'virtually everywhere Western models prevail' (Derrida 1994, 52).

This culture has always been bound to the culture of tele-technology, to mediation and representation. However, today, this relation is accelerated in an unprecedented fashion according to the rhythm of so-called 'communications' as the 'selective and hierarchized production of "information'" (Derrida 1994, 52) and its auto-immunised interpretation. The academic discourse of the technocratic university is welded to this apparatus in an indissociable way. It is almost impossible to watch a news programme without the appearance of an academic witness who provides the most banal and unscholarly of comments to justify or exemplify the content of a news item. Whole news items are nothing more than the appearance of academics to promote their 'research findings' or latest reports; entire university research strategies are written around the stated desire for such appearances. Which university does not now have a press office? In my institution at least half of the Faculties of the university (those that can afford them) have contracts with media consultants who are employed to write 'accessible' accounts of research activities with a view to placing stories in the media or promoting individuals to the level of media figure, talking head or guru.

There is no point at which it is thought that academic research (another obscure term which we will need to tackle on another day) is inimical to this form of reductionism or that certain forms of thought might be allergic to passing through a me ia culture in this way. At any rate the idea of policy is related, in no doubt complex and over-determined, ways to this mutation in the channels which run between the academic and public spaces, which have more or less neutralised the notion of the public intellectual (another term we might caution against today given its historical relation to closely policed questions of propriety, gender, race and sexuality).

A thinking of the relationship between the text of Derrida and the articulation of policy will necessarily involve a new thinking of the ground of policy and its relation to the media-political culture of today. What if it were possible to imagine something like a 'counter-policy', a thinking of policy as an intervention in the world that neither separated theory from practice nor accepted the easy place of the academic in the political-mediatic apparatus? What if it were possible to set policy- making against itself, to make policies to which policy was itself allergic? This would be an impossible policy, policy which understood the idea of policy to be impossible: policy without telos, policy without policy, policy no longer able to accept the name of policy but the only policy to be worthy of the name as an action in the material world. In imaging such a decentring of policy, one might also pertinently ask, does politics as such always imply an idea of policy in the same way that it always implies an idea of the human? That is to say does policy itself (as the pretext, off-spring and crafting of the moment of political antagonism) imply or assume an inherited idea of the human? Given the location of policy, in its modern sense, within the topography of contemporary political culture, in which policy precedes and enables the agency of political man then the answer is surely yes and a rethinking of policy would be nothing less than an entire disarticulation of this logo-anthro- onto-pological schema. Such a thinking of policy would then require the inauguration of a counter-culture as well as a counter-policy, with its own counter-institutions and spaces of articulation that would of course have their own vexed relation to channels of communication and the new technologies of the digital epoch as an exercise of public critical reason. One should also say that it is undoubtedly the case that such cultural transformations are already under way in spaces not visible to the academic-anthropological or mediatic gaze, across the hinterlands of the world wide web, cyber activism and in corners of the thinking world un-compromised by the funded research culture of the transnational university. However, in this text I am only proposing to take a position not to do the work that the sustainability of such a position would require. I am also talking about a relation between philosophy and policy that would be, unlike other articulations of militancy currently to be found in cyber-space, both properly philosophical and properly a 'political science', if such a thing exists.

# WOT – ALTERNATIVE IS REIMAGINING POLITICS

**The role of policy is not simply to make a better political action to be better utilized, but rather to have a open orientation that does justice to the other. Deconstruction instead challenges the metaphysical presumption to pre-write the future.**

**Mcquillan 08**

(Derrida and Policy: Is Deconstruction Really a Social Science? Derrida Today)

One might think that Derrida's invocation of International Law in his later writings would represent an example of a concrete relation between his writing and something that could take the manner of a policy formulation. In fact, while Derrida speaks eloquently of the need for International Law and demonstrates its philosophical genealogy, he actually does very little by way of elaborating what such a law might look like. Once again we return to the insurmountable difficulty of deconstruction's refusal to programme or pre-empt the arrival of an unknowable future. In fact, looked at in these terms, policy-making would seem to have a distinct relation to fortune telling, divination and other such modes of predicting the future. Future-ologists are of course a specialist sub-branch of policy-makers. In the context of university administration, I have never written a 'forward-looking strategic plan' that did not have to be rewritten six months later due to unforeseen circumstances. Derrida's discussion of International Law in the early 1990s was certainly prescient, given the way in which International Law has moved from the margins of legal specialism to become the locus of global politics through the development of the International Criminal Court, the test cases of 'universal jurisdiction', the demands of globalisation and the obfuscations of the war on terror. However, the question of International Law in Derrida remains to be determined according to a double braid of reading: firstly, the deconstruction of the inherited western model of law and ethics which prevails in the discourse on the international, humanitarian and cosmopolitical; secondly, a responsible philosophical response to singular events as they arrive in the present calling for an exercise of public, critical reason. In other words, the deconstruction of International Law will proceed on a provisional and strategic basis. International Law is, of course, only an example for Derrida of a wider mutation in the conditions of sovereignty in the world today. This account of sovereignty is in turn part of a more general undoing of the logocentric schema, in Derrida, which points out that sovereignty as such is always already decentred by its inability to master the unconditionality of the other which it seeks to suppress, thus rendering the sovereign no longer sovereign. For example, the unconditionality of literature makes it both powerless in the sovereign public realm of techno-media-politics and simultaneously the one thing that this sovereignty cannot master, thus demonstrating the impotence of sovereignty and the all-powerful powerlessness of unconditionality. This is a scenario that can be moved around the tropes of the Derridean corpus in so far as it describes the familiar strategies of and resistances to phallogocentrism in a more general sense. Policy without conditions or a policy of unconditionality would seem to be no policy at all, or at least nothing policy-makers would recognise as policy in its proper sense. After all a policy without limits or purpose would be policy without utility and would be of no use to anyone, except as a policy of resistance.

Here is the rub, the moment that one begins to attempt a thought experiment of this kind one runs into immediate and insurmountable difficulties, not because deconstruction has nothing to say to politics or that deconstruction is a weak ontology, parasitical on the strong discourse of political culture but because if one were to take seriously (if not literally) what Derrida has to say about the disarticulation of the inherited metaphysical models of the political, it quickly becomes apparent that a new politics does not require that 'deconstruction' (if such a thing exists) be translated into a number of thematic policy choices but that the entire political model which rests upon policy as an enactable idea be subject to complete and irreversible displacement. Policy-making as it stands is untenable from a deconstructive point of view because political culture as such is untenable. The unconditionality and infinite responsibility of deconstruction, does not mean simply that we should make better policy (or that we should make better policy, simply) but that in doing so the entire apparatus of western political culture be removed and rethought in an unpredictable and emerging future. The frustration that many feel with deconstruction's reading of the political lies in this refusal to provide 'concrete policies'. However, it is this refusal to decide on the undecideable in advance which is the whole point of deconstruction. It is the promise of deconstruction. This is not the same thing as opposition politicians saying they could not say what their expenditure plans would be until they were in government and saw the state of the accounts (that is just a lie for political expediency and such people always have well developed plans for what they would do). The promise of deconstruction would be that in encountering the other, justice ought to be done, even if the progressive structure of the promise relied on the necessary, in principle, ability for promises to be broken or to fail. The politics of deconstruction can then only ever follow the dual strategy we saw above: the critical reading of the western inheritance and the disarticulation of the event as it arrives in the present. In this sense, deconstruction cannot be a political science because it has no means of securing the predictive force necessary to a science. Rather, deconstruction is that which puts all and every such prediction in doubt. As Bismarck remarked, politics is not a science it is an art. Elsewhere, he is said to have noted that it was the art of the possible. As Derek Attridge has put it, for Derrida, it is the art of the impossible (Attridge 2007). It is, nevertheless, an art and as such is on the side of the unconditional rather than the sovereign.

# **WOT – ALTERNATIVE IS REIMAGINING POLITICS**

Terrorism is the present absence that ontologically structures democracy assistance. This spectral status is its role as the otherness of democracy assistance. Politics thus is the mystification of the community of democratic’s as opposed to terrorists. This thinking is a politics that re-conceptualizes the political order as such.

**McQuillan, 2009**

(Martin, MA, PhD, Glasgow, Deconstruction After 9/11, Routledge, pg. 100-103)

If, far from fallingithin the ambit of the New International, anti-capitalism is in fact a return of a certain spectre of Poujade then how might this essay approach its original question, what is the New International? The answer, I think, lies in the structure of this ontological question, `what is the New International?' It would be a mistake to believe that the ernational, like any other trope (or quasi trope) within Derridean thought, can be held accountable to the metaphysical concepts of onto-politics because it is precisely these metaphysical concepts that deconstruction wishes to interro gate and displace. Deconstruction cannot account for itself within interrogate a traditional political order because deconstruction wants to understand and exceed all and every such order. It is for this reason that deconstruction cannot provide a politics in the way that this term has hitherto been, metaphysically, understood, even if it is the constant desire of metaphysics to drag deconstruction back into a closed order of politics. This is the difference between a desire for `the politics of deconstruction' which places the emphasis on `politics' as preceding and authorising deconstruction, and the `politics of deconstruction' in which politics is always already in deconstruction demonstrating the impossibility of its own metaphysical desire for definitive and quantitative closure. Thus, the New International despite appearances cannot be described in terms of the onto-political characteristics of other communist internationals. The New International will have no manifesto, no congress, no offices, no brigades, no party and no web site. The New International is a ghost. It is hauntological not ontological.

This may appear as something of a disappointment to those looking for a new politics (or even a deconstructive politics) but it is precisely its spectral status (i.e. its inability to manifest itself) that makes the New International `new' in this sense. A deconstruction of politics will require a rethinking, from the ground up, of everything (without exception) that the field of the political has been subject to. The entire political tradition, including the very definition of politics as a certain kind of action and intervention, must be rethought as a conceptual order in, and in need of, deconstruction. In fact, the political field might be thought of as exemplary of the work of metaphysics itself because it is here that the trope of the material grounds itself as the trope of tropes. The material is that concept against which all other concepts must be judged and inevitably be found wanting in contrast. Traditional politics, as in the case of No Logo, secures the material as a fixed point of departure around which it organises its conceptual order ('class', `economics', `liberation' etc.). In turn each of these concepts, because they have a defined relation to a fixed point, can seem to acquire fixity themselves and so translate from a conceptual into a material order. In this sense the material, as foundational of politics, is exemplary of the work of any ontotheology. Correspondingly, it would be an error to ask what is (the material nature of) the New International because the material is the metaphysical concept par excellence (disguising its conceptual status to order a closed political field). If when, in a traditional political order, all concepts appear impoverished in contrast to material criteria then the material will occupy a transcendental position in relation to all concepts. Conversely, since the material is said to define politics it follows that all concepts fall within the remit of politics (or at least they cannot escape the field of politics) because they are defined as conceptual in contrast to the material. Thus, every conceptual encounter, and deconstruction is nothing but conceptual encounters, cannot help but be political. This is perhaps what Geoffrey Bennington means when he notes in a recent text that one effect of deconstruction may be to suggest `an irreducible conceptual politics'.50

If politics is an exemplary metaphysics it is because the material both founds and closes all conceptual orders. It is, within traditional political thinking, arche and telos, reason and measure, for all concepts and so of the political order itself. Thus, metaphysics both relies upon the material as an organising principle of its schema while holding the material as irreducibly conceptual within its own boundaries. Metaphysics is simultaneously made and unmade by the material, just as the material has its conceptual status both erased and confirmed by metaphysics. This relation between politics and metaphysics suggests a trembling within the very concept of the concept itself, revealing that not only are the most `conceptual' moments of theory or philosophy political but that the most material aspects of politics are conceptual through and through. This includes, or is especially the case for, `action' because it is the most material trope of materialism, the metaphor of metaphors that transports itself out of its own metaphoricity. Action is irreducibly complex because it is irreducibly conceptual.

In light of this, Derrida's text may become a little clearer when he calls the New International a `communism' `without conjoined mate, without organisation, without party, without nation, without State, without property'.5' This is a communism without communism (an inoperative community as Nancy would have it) which fails to operate through the familiar, impossible axiomatic of the X without X. An axiomatic that rejects the value of value (i.e. presence) in a granted or presupposed system, and thus the very idea of an axiomatic. This may appear to some as an insolvent political ethic but it is, as Derrida explains in Politics of Friendship, the very condition of a politics. To bypass the aporias of the X without X would be to `miss the hardest, the most resistant, the most irreducible, the othermost of the "thing itself".52 A politics which ignored this otherness of the thing would, says Derrida, `deck itself out in "realism" just in time to fall short of the thing—and to repeat, repeat and repeat again, with neither consciousness nor memory of its compulsive droning'.53 It is this question of the otherness of the thing that will define the relation between deconstruction and the political, as well as characterizing the New International. It is the key point of the whole trope of spectrality (not ontology, the thing itself but hauntology, the otherness of the thing). Once again, contra Klein, this is not a denial of the thing itself or indeed of action. Rather, it is a thorough questioning of the possible means of access to the thing, as a precondition of engaging with it.

The New International, one might say, is impossible: `without contract, "out of joint", without co-ordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without citizenship, without common belonging to a class'. And yet Derrida insists that the New International exists, it is `a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret [not absolutely secret in the Derridean sense of a-phenomenal but `almost secret' i.e. in some sense phenomenal] link'S4 which allies its members (although the term `member' here would no longer be appropriate) `in a new, concrete, and real way'." So, how can an impossible international, which cannot manifest itself, be either `concrete' or `real'? An answer might run as follows. All communities, even those that think they are fully formed communities in a metaphysical sense, are inoperative communities. Their work demonstrates their own necessary deconstruction of the idea of community and will always show the impossibility of community. So community as such is impossible even among self-consciously `concrete' communities. The New International begins with a recognition of this impossibility as a condition of its existence, i.e. the New International begins by addressing its own otherness. This does not make it any less `real' than other alliances but does mean that it has already begun the task of thinking the field of the political as a means of intervening in that field. The New International then is an inoperative community of theorizing and interpretation qua praxis.56 An inoperative community of the perhaps before the question, perhaps. Certainly, it is an inoperative community of transformative interpretation.

This interpretation is structurally interminable and can never be an adequate preparation for a moment of decision or actions' As an inoperative community of interpretation, the New International cannot adequately translate itself into a community of action identical with itself. Any moment of action retains a necessary relation to interminable analysis but a decision, or, action is always made by the other. Interpretation can never adequately exhaust the possibilities of thinking through a moment of decision and therefore when that decision comes to be taken there always remains an excess of analysis that any terminable interpretation cannot account for. If a decision could be accounted for by a terminable interpretation ii would of course not be a decision as such but the enactment of a presupposed programme. The decision is always excessive or it is not a decision its excess does not legitimate silence. It is this excess that ensures a diremption between the agency of the interpretative subject and the interpretative( demands of a decision. There is then a gap between the subject and decision-taker-in-the-subject. A decision is never taken by an agent but alway by the other, any action is not the act of a sovereign subject but is alway the act of the other, who acts before the subject ever begins to comprehend the possibility of an action. This is to say that action, in so far as it mus always be `action without action', or action that is conditioned by the otherness of action, is always impossible. Action is impossible if we understand action, in a metaphysical way, to be the agency of a sovereign subject. The, New International then may appear, from a metaphysical point of view an anaemic political entity but in fact its `action without action' begins t4 think through the very possibility and condition of all action as such. The New International does not offer a political movement so much as it move to keep open the event of alterity which makes political action possible an inevitable (if the other always acts before I do) but which political movements, from the Poujadists to the anti-capitalists, have always attempted to foreclose.

# WOT – Answers to: THREATS ARE REAL/INEVITABLE

### Their inevitability arguments are epistemologically wrong & counterproductive

Leighton 2007

(Paul, Eastern Michigan Criminology Pf., “Demystifying Terrorism: ‘Crazy Islamic Terrorists Who Hate Us Because We’re Free?’ “, http://www.stopviolence.com/9-11/terrorism/Crazy-Islamic-Terrorists.pdf)

This current of reasoning from Ibn Taymiyya is handed down through the Crusades,. European conquest, and colonialism—that all of which found humiliating—to bin Laden. Al- Qaeda and its supporters view less-militant interpretations of Islam as coming from the paid lackeys of apostate leaders bought off by the United States Indeed, such governments tend to be more Western, more secular, and thus not only place human judgment over the divine, but also lead Muslims away from the true faith. For bin Laden, the overthrow of such governments is an important step to securing rule by those such as the Taliban, who govern in accordance with Islamic law. The ultimate goal is to create an Islamic superpower and resurrect the glory days where Islam was a powerful force, united under a divinely appointed ruler. To this end, bin Laden is willing to engage in violence against a wide range of people who stand in the way of this vision, and has indicated that acquiring a nuclear weapon is a religious duty (Benjamin and Simon 2002:140, 160). ¶ Hudson (1999) notes that many terrorism experts are skeptical of explanations that rely on mental illness or psychopathy because these explanations hide social and political issues the terrorists take very seriously. This point is crucial for understanding September 11 because bin Laden is a “terrorist hero” similar to the Western outlaws and urban gangsters Kooistra (1989) ¶ writes about. Indeed, after September 11, The Pew Center’s global attitudes survey asked people around the world which leader they “had confidence in to do the right thing in world affairs.” Osama bin Laden received substantially higher ratings than President Bush or British Prime Minister Blair in six countries whose combined population is almost 500 million people (Pew Center 2003). This survey is consistent with earlier information that “scores of Pakistanis have named their newborn sons Osama,” highlighting that the terrorists may be on the fringe “but those who applaud are the disenfranchised Muslims everywhere” (Reeve 1999:203). Believing that the September 11 suicide terrorists were crazy or had questionable pathologies might be comforting but disguises an important issue about how widespread support for bin Laden is. ¶ Kooistra’s (1989:52) suggests that hero status occurs when people find “some symbolic meaning in his criminality"—or his political violence, in the case of bin Laden. With criminals, support for the symbolic meaning happens when substantial segments of the public feel “outside the law” because the law is no longer seen as an instrument of justice but as a tool of oppression wielded by favored interests" (1989:11). In terms of terrorism, the message sent by the political violence finds support when large segments of the population feel disenfranchised within the social, political and economic order of the world. ¶ The analysis of disenfranchisement points back to the above excerpt of the root causes of terrorism by Benjamin and Simon (2003): Muslims feel oppressed because of America’s military might, foreign policy, and the invasive spread of American culture and values. While discussions of these issues do occur, they do not follow from beliefs about crazy terrorists, so one of the interests served by the myth is a general one of American hegemony in the world. American hegemony refers to American dominance and all the ways it is maintained, from the use of military force to unexamined beliefs about the superiority of United States values. Exposing the ¶ myth of crazy terrorists who hate us because we’re free does not mean relinquishing power, but rather being more open to thinking about how the rest of the world sees us and how our presence influences others. ¶ The rhetoric of crazy, freedom-hating terrorists also serves the interests of the president in his attempt to rally support for whatever actions he believes should be taken, even when those actions and strategies are problematic. The division of us(rational freedom-lovers) versus them(crazy freedom-haters), when combined with rhetoric emphasizing the stark choice of “with us” or “against us,” minimizes legitimate debate in favor of unquestioning support. While national unity and secrecy can be important at times, people should be free to raise questions or oppose plans they consider to be flawed, without accusations of being unpatriotic or giving comfort to terrorists. Partisan interest, not democracy, is more likely to be hurt by full information and robust debate. ¶ Further, whether a president is using terrorism for partisan purposes is a question that should be asked regardless of which party holds the office. The best interests of politicians (especially around election time) may or may not be the same as the country’s long-term best interest; patriotic titles on legislation may or may not be an accurate reflection of the bill’s content. ¶ A belief that terrorists are crazy or irrational may lead to an overemphasis on security to deal with the relatively small number of terrorist organizations, rather than taking a more holistic approach to the root causes of terrorism. The belief that terrorists are driven by anti-Americanism and hatred of freedom reinforces the idea that terrorism is an accumulation of the ¶ irrational or “slick” beliefs of a few, rather than the militant wing of a substantive political agenda that may receive widespread support, including financial aid. The myth that terrorists are mainly motivated by anti-Americanism ignores the violence they have done to other Muslims, and sets up Islam as the enemy rather than highlighting potential alliances with Arab leaders. ¶ Further, the belief that terrorists are simply evil implies that the threat requires unprecedented presidential power, even going beyond the scope of powers prescribed by the Constitution during a time of declared war. The ability to detain people and declare them outside of both the U.S. criminal law and the protections of international law is a problematic way to defend democratic freedoms (Leighton 2004), and, when used against Muslims, adds to their feelings of persecution. Declaring that well-established international law does not apply, adds to perceptions that the United States thinks it is above the laws it frequently insists other countries obey. Ignoring international law at this juncture also undercuts policies favoring the development of international law to deal with a growing number of disputes caused by a shrinking and increasingly interconnected global village.

# WOT – Answers to: THREATS ARE REAL/INEVITABLE

### Their inevitability argument is wrong, causes global war, & prevents an analytic that better addresses the cause of terrorism

Suri 2013

(UT Austin – IR, Jeremi, “The Myths and Realities of Anti-Americanism”, http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=37406)

Max Paul Friedman’s sophisticated and deeply researched new book charts the long pedigree for these common contemporary judgments about the “anti-American” quality of those who oppose and sometimes attack the United States. Friedman writes that the “anti-American” label for critics “dates back at least to 1767.” Drawing on the correspondence of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and others, he argues that the “initial, neutral definition of being opposed to America or Americans, comparable to anti-French or anti-Russian sentiment, evolved to acquire a deeper, dual meaning: domestically, the term carried the implication of disloyalty and betrayal, used to delegitimize opponents of war and expansion; internationally, it implied an irrational, often culturally based, hatred of democracy. These associations have clung to the word right up to our own time, giving it a special rhetorical power that enables the concept of anti-Americanism to cause two kinds of damage: stifling dissent at home while distorting Americans’ perceptions of the motives and intentions of foreign critics” (p. 21).¶ Leading American policymakers and thinkers in the nineteenth century, according to Friedman, defined a binary world of American justice, democracy, and capitalism combating a world filled with degenerate, tyrannical, and militaristic regimes. This binary, enshrined as “an enduring--and misleading--analytical category,” set a pattern for American politics during the twentieth century, in Friedman’s account (p. 51). It encouraged widespread dismissal of European progressives, like George Bernard Shaw, and Latin American nationalists, like José Martí, who pursued a politics of freedom that departed consciously from the American model. These figures and others, Friedman shows, lacked credibility within many parts of the United States because their opponents ostracized them with the label of being “anti-American.” American readers developed a caricatured view of what Shaw and Martí, later Jean-Paul Sartre and Fidel Castro, aimed to achieve. Friedman argues that this intellectual prejudice crippled American policymakers from understanding nationalism, social democracy, and other progressive ideas. Instead of learning to work with local activists who pursued goals compatible with American interests, the binary world of alleged allies and “anti-Americans” encouraged policymakers to side with the dictators who praised Washington, but failed to implement democratic programs.¶ Friedman is particularly strong in his application of this insight to early twentieth-century American policies in Mexico. He condemns Washington’s support for authoritarians who undermined possibilities for more grassroots democracy and development: “The point is that anti-Americanism as a concept contributes nothing to understanding the relations between Mexico and the United States. On the contrary, it takes a universal phenomenon--hostility generated by friction between neighboring countries--and turns it into a particular phenomenon, a peculiarly Latin kind of irrationality given to outbursts that, it is implied, should be treated like children’s tantrums. This ascribes a monopoly on reason to Americans, who claim the right to judge Mexican behavior as illegitimate, especially when that behavior involves Mexican objections to American actions” (p. 66).¶ This powerful analytical point connects chapters in Rethinking Anti-Americanism on the Cold War in Europe and Latin America. Friedman also includes a detailed chapter on U.S. relations with France under President Charles de Gaulle. He shows quite persuasively how De Gaulle jealously guarded French national interests by seeking more independence from the United States and new initiatives in North Africa, Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia. De Gaulle also promoted aggressive rhetoric to instill pride and self-confidence in his citizens after decades of war and relative decline. Friedman argues that American citizens and policymakers failed to appreciate the rational and reasonable motives for De Gaulle’s actions because of an obsession with his alleged anti-Americanism. His actions were somehow immoral because they insulted American claims to self-righteousness. More controversial, Friedman claims that the United States suffered in Vietnam and other regions of the world because of a stubborn dismissal of French advice, despite its relevance for American decision making.[3]¶ For the Cold War as a whole, Friedman criticizes American policymakers for reinforcing rather than breaking down assumptions about a bipolar world of pro- and anti-American hostility. Containment, in this account, reinforced divisions and denied possibilities for geopolitical compromise. Friedman takes particular aim at President Dwight Eisenhower’s Psychological Strategy Board and its successor, the Operations Coordinating Board, for spreading propaganda that overemphasized “anti-Americanism” and denied what the author sees as the reality of the Cold War: Soviet insecurity and conflict over geopolitical interests in Europe, Asia, and other regions.[4] For Friedman, Washington’s obsession with anti-Americanism encouraged a global manifestation of what he condemns in early twentieth-century U.S.-Mexican relations: excessive intervention, misdirected support of pro-American authoritarians, and a dismissal of the real material issues (including insecurity and inequality) that caused conflict. In a thoughtful chapter on the domestic and international protests of the late Cold War, Friedman extends this argument to show how the “anti-American” label diminished the influence of patriotic and innovative critics--especially peace and ecological activists.¶ The epilogue of Rethinking Anti-Americanism brings us back full circle, applying Friedman’s analysis to the “Global War on Terror” and its contemporary manifestations. Friedman is clear in his condemnation of terrorists who target civilians; he offers no apology for such immoral violence. He does, however, criticize Americans for failing to interrogate the roots of popular support for terrorism in the Middle East and other regions. Contrary to both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, Friedman sees little cause in ideology or deep hatred of the United States. He argues that there are, in fact, strong reservoirs of respect and admiration for American society in various regions, including the Middle East. Instead, Friedman finds opposition to the United States rooted in interventionist military and economic policies emanating from Washington and targeted at oil-rich states. Citizens in the Middle East feel victimized, according to this account, and they oppose U.S. government policies because they believe that these policies reinforce inequality and injustice throughout the region.

# WOT - Answers to: THREATS ARE REAL/INEVITABLE

### Your conception of terrorists as innately violent or radical is wrong & counterproductive

Leighton 207

(Paul, Eastern Michigan Criminology Pf., “Demystifying Terrorism: ‘Crazy Islamic Terrorists Who Hate Us Because We’re Free?’ “, http://www.stopviolence.com/9-11/terrorism/Crazy-Islamic-Terrorists.pdf)

“September 11 changed everything” is an observation that is heard frequently along with discussions of a “post 9/11 world.” Yet before the terrorist attacks, criminology had only a “grudging acceptance of terrorism” (Rosenfeld 2002:1) and the situation has changed surprising little. Certainly, many criminology students will find employment and increased opportunities in security and related fields, but the discipline has made little movement to build on its understanding of violent crime and hate crimes to better understand the mass murders of terrorists. Indeed, serial killers are still a trendy topic, with much interest in psychological profiling and “mind hunting.” Getting inside the head of Bundy, Gacy, or Dahmer is more popular than understanding Osama bin Laden (who has killed far more people than those serial killers combined). ¶ While there are some patterns to understanding serial killers, much of what people find fascinating is aspects of individual pathology. In contrast, terrorism is political violence and thus requires knowledge of social and political issues. International terrorism requires some understanding of global politics and history, which are not popular topics in the United States .Even after September 11, few Americans increased their consumption of international news. ¶ Anti-American terrorism is more difficult still to study. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, the emphasis was on creating solidarity rather than understanding—and seeing the world through the eyes of—the enemy.” ¶ Further, those who do try to understand anti-American terrorism and to see the world as the terrorists do run the risk of seeming unpatriotic and of appearing to blame the victims, even though those who do the same with serial killers never hear such accusations. Indeed, one university that simply wanted to require all incoming freshmen to read a book about Islam found itself sued in federal court and berated by a range of conservative groups and Christian evangelists. One news analyst compared the assignment to teaching “*Mein Kamp*” in 1941, and questioned the purpose of making freshmen study “our enemy’s religion”. However, one freshman, demonstrating a much better grasp of the issues, commented: “After the terrorist attacks, I was so angry that I really didn't care to learn anything about Muslims. But I know now that refusing to learn is what causes more anger and confusion” (Johnson 2002:A2). ¶ The author of the book about Islam also noted the importance of understanding, because the United States is likely to have continuing conflicts with Islamic nations and militants. Ignorance is no longer an option. Indeed, without understanding and a willingness to explore uncomfortable issues like anti-Americanism, myths and distortions are likely to flourish. Given the complexity of terrorism and strong mixed feelings about the war on terrorism, there are many myths and problematic simplifications that this chapter could address. The focus, however, will be on several fundamental myths. The first goes to the basic character of terrorists—the belief that they are insane psychopaths bent on evil. The second and third are about the terrorists’ politics and worldview—the belief that they hate us because we’re free and that they are only ¶ motivated by anti-Americanism. Revealing the kernel of truth in these statements facilitate an understanding of terrorism and enables criminology to be more relevant to the issues facing America in the twenty-first Century global village. ¶ Many discussions of the character of terrorists engage in labeling rather than explanation: terrorists have done evil, therefore they are evil (and vice versa). People do not understand—do not want to understand—so the terrorism is seen as senseless and irrational, and people thus assume the terrorists are crazy. Likewise, the mass violence of terrorism seems similar to mass murder, so people assume terrorists must be similar to psychopaths and serial killers. While these characterizations are circular and flawed, the important truth is that terrorists are fanatics or what Hoffer (1951) called “true believer.” Not all true believers endorse violence, writes Hoffer, but “their innermost craving is for a new life—a rebirth—or, failing this, a chance to acquire new elements of pride, confidence, hope, a sense of purpose and worth by an identification with a holy cause” (21). True believers and fanatics see the world in very clear cut terms, so they feel a high degree of moral certainty or righteousness about their position. When combined with a sense that something sacred is threatened the stage is set for action that can include violence. ¶ Terrorists working on their own are considered more likely to have personality disturbances than those working as a team. Occasionally two psychopaths will work together; and frequently one will be clearly dominant. So there is some basis for believing terrorist cells could be explained by personality disorders. But, as discussed below, psychopaths are too egocentric to work together in groups for a larger political or social cause. More generally, personality plays a role in shaping terrorists, especially in terms of how it interacts with events in life that will serve as catalysts for terrorism. The role of mental illness and diagnosable ¶ personality disorders is ultimately a small contribution to explaining terrorism and a focus on these subjects diverts attention from social issues that are the basis for terrorism’s political violence. ¶ The political issues of al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists certainly include anti-Americanism, which is evident from bin Laden’s speeches and his fatwa (religious decree) about the “Zionist-Crusader Alliance.” Although, Europeans waged the Crusades that ravaged Muslim countries, militants see the Crusades as a timeless battle between Islam and forces of western imperialism, which the United States currently seems to embody. But the fatwa’s title also suggests that anti-Semitism, or at least anti-Zionism, is part of the motivation. Furthermore, explaining the terrorism of bin Laden’s followers also involves understanding his reasons for a number of acts that have happened in Arab lands and taken the lives of many fellow Muslims. ¶ To the extent that Islamic extremism is anti-American, the reasons include—and go beyond—American freedom in the abstract. Summarizing a global attitudes survey, the Pew Center (2003:40) found “a pattern of support for democratic principles combined with the perception that their nation is currently lacking in these areas is characteristic of many Muslim nations”. People in countries around the world endorse American democratic values, although they also believe that the social, political and economic freedoms in the United States lead to behaviors that are decadent and materialistic. Islamic militants seize on ambivalent reactions to America in the Muslim community, especially in terms of sexuality, abortion, women’s rights, and homosexuality. Ironically, some of these issues are also concerns of the survivalist right in the United States, a male dominated movement that—while not monolithic in its beliefs—tends to endorse very traditional roles for women, bombs abortion clinics and views homosexuality and interracial mixing as signs of moral decline that must be fervently resisted. ¶ When attempting to make sense of the character of terrorists, the proper context is research showing that “normal” people participate in executions, lynch mobs, military massacres, and genocide. For example, a key figure in the Nazi extermination of Jews was Adolph Eichmann, who was examined by six psychiatrists who proclaimed him as “normal”. “More normal, at any rate, than I am after having examined him,” one of them is said to have exclaimed, while another found that Eichmann’s whole psychological outlook, his attitude toward his wife and children, mother and father, brothers, sisters, and friends, was “not only normal but most desirable” (Arendt 1964:25-26).While Nazis are different from Islamic terrorists and American lynch mobs, what links them is that they all involve normal people acting together to combat what they see as a dangerous threat. The fight that threat is viewed by them as an important and eternal version of “The Good”. ¶ In a wide ranging literature review, Hudson (1999) finds no support for an explanation based on mental illness or abnormality in any of the studies of individual terrorists and groups. The elaborate timing and planning that go into “successful” terrorism are inconsistent with mental disorders. Hudson quotes conclude that terrorists are not psychologically different from non-terrorists. What distinguishes terrorists from non-terrorists is childhood development and radicalizing events, like war or insurrection, which combine with belief systems that are projected on to ever changing regional and global conflicts (Hamm and Leighton 2002). ¶

# WOT FAILS

### We aren’t winning the GWOT – organizations are growing

**Rothkopf 2014**

David Rothkopf is CEO and Editor of the FP Group. His latest book, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear was published in October., “[We Are Losing the War on Terror](http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/10/we-are-losing-the-war-on-terror/)” http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/10/we-are-losing-the-war-on-terror/

The ground truth about the spread of terrorism will be a hard one for many Americans to swallow after 13 costly years of war. Terrorism is spreading worldwide. Our enemies have sustained our blows, adapted, and grown. Two questions loom large as a consequence: Where did we go wrong and what do we do now? Recent headlines and new studies support the conclusion that global terror trends are heading in an ever more dangerous direction. In early June, the Rand Corporation released a [study](http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637.html" \t "_blank) that detailed the growing threat. It reports that in 2007, there were 28 Salafi-jihadist groups like al Qaeda. As of last year, there were 49. In 2007, these groups conducted 100 attacks. Last year, they conducted 950. The study estimates that there were between 18,000 and 42,000 such terrorists active seven years ago. The low-end estimate for last year, at 44,000, is higher than the top estimate for 2007, and the new high-end estimate is 105,000. The administration rightly argues that "core al Qaeda" has sustained "huge" damage. But "core al Qaeda" no longer poses the principle threat to the U.S. homeland. That comes, according to the Rand report, from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. As Rand summarizes the report: "Since 2010, there has been a 58 percent increase in the number of jihadist groups, a doubling of jihadist fighters and a tripling of attacks by Al Qaeda affiliates. The most significant threat to the United States, the report concludes, comes from terrorist groups operating in Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan." As legitimate as the questions that have emerged in the Bowe Bergdahl case may be, they are secondary to the deteriorating situation associated with the war the recently released prisoner went to Afghanistan to fight. There is no denying that the contempt for Congress shown in failing to inform it of the deal — even as perhaps 100 in the administration knew of it — starkly reveals the cynicism behind last year’s faux deferral to Congress on Syria. But it would be far more cynical to continue with the Obama team’s variation on the "mission accomplished" misrepresentations of his predecessor. The war in Iraq was not over or won when we said it was. Nor is the war on terror won or the threat it poses resolved simply by no longer using the term or suggesting our goal was merely to inflict damage on the tiny fraction of terrorists who were associated with the 9/11 attacks. The reality is that we are still fighting the last war on terror even as a new set of risks loom and are made worse by our minimizing their implications for political purposes. In its recent assessment, ["Country Reports on Terrorism 2013,"](http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/" \t "_blank) the State Department acknowledged the trend. It observes that last year attacks worldwide increased almost by half, from 6,700 to 9,700. Nearly 18,000 people died and nearly 33,000 were injured. While the report hails allied forces for making progress combating al Qaeda’s core in the AfPak region, it also notes that the group’s affiliates are becoming more dangerous. The report takes particular note of the threat posed by foreign extremists in Syria, which has become a kind of petri dish in which a growing global terror threat is being cultivated. Estimates on the number of such fighters range from 7,000 to over 20,000. The news that one recent [suicide bomber](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-who-killed-himself-in-syria-suicide-attack-was-from-south-florida-official-says/2014/05/30/03869b6e-e7f4-11e3-a86b-362fd5443d19_story.html" \t "_blank)in Syria was an American and that one of the attackers behind the recent shooting at the Jewish Museum of Belgium [spent time in Syria](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/01/french-suspect-brussels-jewish-museum-attack-syria" \t "_blank) suggests how this threat may evolve over time. It’s not unlikely that, if left unchecked, the long-term consequences of a cadre of fighters trained in Syria who will soon return to their home countries will be one of the darkest legacies of that war — a legacy that may well echo the long-term costs associated with training jihadists in the battle against the Russians in Afghanistan in the 1980s, among whom, of course, was Osama bin Laden.

# WOT FAILS

### Losing the GWOT – bad leadership and info fails

**Seidel 2014**

Jamie Seidel News Corp Australia Network “US General Daniel Bolger frankly admits the War on Terror was lost by poor leadership” <http://www.news.com.au/world/us-general-daniel-bolger-frankly-admits-the-war-on-terror-was-lost-by-poor-leadership/story-fndir2ev-1227119231407>

I AM a United States Army General, and I lost the global war on terrorism … These chilling words are those of Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger. And he doesn’t expect things to get any better. From this opening sentence in his book, [Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars](http://www.npr.org/books/titles/361748865/why-we-lost-a-generals-inside-account-of-the-iraq-and-afghanistan-wars" \t "_blank), General Bolger paints a bleak picture of conflicts of interests, confused agendas and a general lack of knowing what victory is anyway. “It’s like Alcoholics Anonymous,” he says. “Step one is admitting you have a problem. Well, I have a problem. So do my peers. And thanks to our problem, now all of America has a problem. To wit: two lost campaigns and a war gone awry.” It’s not the soldiers They’re fighting harder than ever before, he says. “The courage, discipline, and lethality of our Americans in uniform stand with anything accomplished in the Civil War, both world wars, Korea, or Vietnam. That all went very right. “What went wrong squandered the bravery, sweat, and blood of these fine Americans. Our primary failing in the war involved generalship. If you prefer the war-college lexicon, we — guys like me — demonstrated poor strategic and operational leadership.” He went on to tell National Public Radio earlier this week: “The mistakes, the errors made by guys like me have to be accounted for and explained so we can learn and do better in the event we have to do something like this again.” In his book and in public, General Bolger is surprisingly frank about his — and his military’s — failures: “I was present when key decisions were made, delayed, or avoided. I made, delayed, or avoided a few myself.” “By the enemy’s hand, abetted by my ignorance, my arrogance, and the inexorable fortunes of war, I lost eighty men and women under my charge; more than three times that number were wounded. Those sad losses are … all my fault.” Things started going wrong before the “War on Terror” even started. “We should have known this one was going to go bad when we couldn’t even settle on a name. In the wake of the horrific al-Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, we tried out various labels,” General Bolger writes. “The guys in the Pentagon basement at first offered Operation Infinite Justice, which sounded fine, both almighty and righteous. Then various hand-wringers noted that it might upset the Muslims … Well, better incoherent than insensitive, I guess.” Aside from semantics, what was his biggest problem? Fighting the right enemy “We knew within a day or two of the 9/11 attacks that it was al-Qaeda, a terrorist network that had a headquarters element, if you would call it that, or a chairman of the board in Osama bin Laden … But that’s not who we ended up fighting most of the time,” he said. Instead, the United States went to war against Iraq. “We ended up fighting Sunni Arab insurgents … who again — although they might make common cause with al-Qaeda — those weren’t the guys who attacked us on 9/11,” General Bolger said. “We waged a Global War on Terrorism against enemies referred to vaguely as terrorists, cowards, evildoers, and extremists. Although those descriptions were rather generic, somehow we always ended up going after the same old bunch of Islamists and their ilk. Our opponents had no illusions about who our targets were, even if some of us did. His cause also had little support. “It became obvious that we were fighting an insurgent enemy mixed into a civil population that was suspicious of us anyway as outsiders -and that was true in both Afghanistan and Iraq,” he said. The next problem was information Despite the billions spent on spy networks that reach into the mobile phones and email accounts of almost everyone on earth, little was known about the US Army’s actual opponents. “It’s very, very difficult to take even the great troops that we have and send them into a village to try and sort out which ... might be insurgents, who might be just people living in the area (and) who might potentially be government supporters,” he said, especially “when you don’t speak the language and you really don’t understand what’s going on in that village very well.”

### Domestic terror growing – internet anonymity

**Konstantinides 2015**

[ANNETA KONSTANTINIDES FOR DAILYMAIL.COM](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/search.html?s=&authornamef=Anneta+Konstantinides+For+Dailymail.com) “Report claims 'Lone Wolf' domestic terrorism is on the rise... with an attack or plan foiled every 34 days since 2009” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2952467/Southern-Poverty-Law-Center-finds-lone-wolf-domestic-terrorism-rise.html  
While recent attacks in Paris and Sydney dominate the headlines, a new report has found that domestic terrorism by 'lone wolf' assailants is on the rise. A terrorist attack or foiled encounter has taken place, on average, every 34 days in the US since 2009, according to a study released today by the Southern Poverty Law Center. The watchdog group urged the government to pay more attention to domestic terrorist attacks, citing 63 victims in six years from plots carried out by American extremists, including right-wing radicals and homegrown jihadists. Mark Potok, the study's editor, said the report was not 'trying to diminish the very real jihadist threat' abroad, but rather implored the government to take notice of the dangers at home as well, according to [Yahoo! News](http://news.yahoo.com/watchdog-report-rise-of-lone-wolf-domestic-terrorists-is-dangerous-situation-002912201.html" \t "_blank). 'We have known since Timothy McVeigh murdered 168 people in Oklahoma City in 1995 that there is a very real and very substantial threat in terms of terrorism from our fellow Americans,' he said. The concept of the 'lone wolf', defined as a person who carries out a terrorist attack entirely on his own, gained popularity in the 1980s from a violent member of the Ku Klux Klan. Louis Beam advocated for radicals to stop acting together in large groups - which only made it easier for them to get caught - and instead called for 'lone wolf action or leaderless resistance' that involved no more than six men. The [SPLC study](http://www.splcenter.org/lone-wolf" \t "_blank) found that 74 per cent of the 63 incidents examined from April 1, 2009, through Feburary 1, 2015, were carried out or planned by a single person. And 90 per cent of the incidents were just the work of one or two people. According to the report, lone wolf's are all the more dangerous because often nobody else knows about their plan for violence. This is because homegrown terrorists are hiding themselves 'in the anonymity and safety of the Internet', Potok said. +4 +4 The 2012 massacre of six people at a Wisconsin Sikh temple by a neo-Nazi, and the murder of two police officers and a bystander last summer by a Las Vegas couple with anti-government views, were two of the incidents included in the study. Following the recent attacks in Sydney and Paris, the White House will hold a summit next week to discuss countering violent extremism. Another recent terrorist act included was the massacre of six people at a Wisconsin Sikh temple by neo-Nazi Wade Michael Page (pictured) But Potok has concerns the meeting will focus too heavily 'on the threat of Islamist terrorism'. 'The government, at least in our view, has fallen down in many ways with respect to dealing with domestic terrorism' he said. National Security Council spokesman Ned Price said the summit will not focus 'on any particular religion, ideology or political movement,' he wrote in an email to Yahoo News. He said the summit will 'address contemporary challenges' and attempt to 'draw lessons that are applicable to the full spectrum of violent extremists'. A task force dedicated to domestic terrorism was created after the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, but it disbanded not long after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security's team dedicated to non-Islamic domestic terrorism similarly fell apart in 2009 after it was heavily criticized for a report stating that right-wing radicalism grew exponentially following the election of Barack Obama to office in 2009. Attorney General Eric Holder announced last summer that the task force that disintegrated in 2001 would be revived, although the SPLC has noted that a meeting has yet to be held. The report found that there were two main motivations fueling domestic terrorism. Almost half of the attacks in the last six years were fueled by anti-government radicals, whereas 51 per cent of the incidents were inspired by ideologies 'of hate', including both white supremacy and radical Islamism. But after the recent attacks in Paris and Sydney, combined with the ongoing brutality of ISIS, Potok said Muslims in America are 'clearly under fire'. This week three young American-born Muslim students in North Carolina were brutally executed by their neighbor Craig Stephen Hicks. Although the most recent shooting in Chapel Hill has yet to be ruled a hate crime - police believe it was caused by a parking dispute - Potok said he believes the country will only continue to see similar violence. 'It is very likely to get worse before it gets better.'

# WOT – Answers to: NAS LINK

### NSA doesn’t aid in detection efforts – surveillance has a negligible impact

**Benkler 2013**

Yochai Benkler is a law professor and director of the [Berkman Center for Internet & Society](http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/) at Harvard University. “Fact: the NSA gets negligible intel from Americans' metadata. So end collection” http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulk-metadata-surveillance-intelligence

Congress may be on the verge of prohibiting the NSA from continuing its bulk telephony metadata collection program. Two weeks ago, the Senate national security dissenters: [Wyden](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/03/the-fact-that-the-nsa-collected-cell-site-data-is-a-big-deal-but-so-is-the-fact-they-admitted-it/), Udall, Paul, and Blumenthal proposed prohibition. Last week, the move received a major boost from a bipartisan proposal by core establishment figures: [Senator Patrick Leahy](http://www.webpronews.com/sen-leahy-introduces-usa-freedom-act-to-reign-in-nsa-2013-10), and Representatives Jim Sensenbrenner and John Conyers. It's a prohibition whose time has come. Dragnet surveillance, or bulk collection, goes to the heart of what is wrong with the turn the [NSA](http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/nsa) has taken since 2001. It implements a perpetual "state of emergency" mentality that inverts the basic model outlined by the fourth amendment: that there are vast domains of private action about which the state should remain ignorant unless it provides clear prior justification. And all public evidence suggests that, from its inception in 2001 to this day, bulk collection has never made more than a marginal contribution to securing Americans from terrorism, despite its costs. In a 2 October hearing of the Senate judiciary committee, Senator Leahy[challenged the NSA chief](http://dissenter.firedoglake.com/2013/10/02/senate-hearing-us-intelligence-leaders-confronted-for-misleading-public-on-effectiveness-of-nsa-programs/), General Keith Alexander: Would you agree that the 54 cases that keep getting cited by the administration were not all plots, and that of the 54 only 13 had some nexus to the US? Would you agree with that, yes or no? Alexander responded: Yes. Leahy then demanded that Alexander confirm what his deputy, Christopher Inglis, had said in the prior week's testimony: that there is only one example where collection of bulk data is what stopped a terrorist activity. Alexander responded that Inglis might have said two, not one. Advertisement In fact, what Inglis had said the week before was that there was one case "that comes close to a but-for example and that's the case of [Basaaly Moalin](http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/09/basaaly_moalin_s_defense_team_takes_on_mass_nsa_telephone_surveillance.html)". So, who is Moalin, on whose fate the NSA places the entire burden of justifying its metadata collection program? Did his capture foil a second 9/11? A cabby from San Diego, Moalin had immigrated as a teenager from Somalia. In February, he was convicted of providing material assistance to a terrorist organization: he had transferred $8,500 to al-Shabaab in Somalia. After the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, few would argue that al-Shabaab is not a terrorist organization. But al-Shabaab is involved in a local war, and is not invested in attacking the US homeland. The indictment against Moalin explicitly stated that al-Shabaab's enemies were the present Somali government and "its Ethiopian and African Union supporters". Perhaps, it makes sense for prosecutors to pursue Somali Americans for doing essentially what [some Irish Americans did to help the IRA](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/reports/america.html); perhaps not. But this single successful prosecution, under a vague criminal statute, which stopped a few thousand dollars from reaching one side in a local conflict in the Horn of Africa, is the sole success story for the NSA bulk domestic surveillance program. At the hearing, perhaps trying to bolster Alexander's feeble defense of the program's effectiveness, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper[complained](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nsa-surveillance-20131003,0,2535208.story) that "plots foiled" should not be the metric. He said: There's another metric I would use; let's call it the "peace of mind metric". In the case of the Boston Marathon bomber, we were able to use these tools to determine whether there was, or was not, a subsequent plot in NYC. Clapper actually used the clearest example that his program offers Americans little real security – its failure to pick up the Tsarnaev brothers before they attacked – as a way of persuading us that we should use an amorphous and unmeasurable "peace of mind" metric; peace of mind we should gain from knowing that the same system that failed to detect the Boston bombers also detected no bombers in New York. One is left picturing [Inspector Clouseau](http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/The_Return_of_the_Pink_Panther): I did not know the bank was being robbed because I was engaged in my sworn duty as a police officer. The admissions Leahy forced out of the NSA heads and DNI Clapper that they have been systematically overstating the effectiveness of bulk collection are consistent with the only other official assessments of bulk collection. The sole publicly available [FISC opinion (pdf)](https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/dupe_of_039_redacted.ex_-_ocr.pdf) that assesses the impact of bulk collection from 2006 to 2009 was unimpressed that: [T]he government's submission cites three examples in which the FBI opened three new preliminary investigations of persons in the US based on tips from the BR metadata program. Judge Walton wrote that this achievement "does not seem particularly significant". Perhaps most damning are the results of the consensus report authored by the[five inspectors general](https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/psp.pdf) of the Departments of Defense and Justice and the CIA, NSA, and Office of DNI, mandated by Congress as part of the Fisa Amendments Act of 2008. That report provides the most detailed official assessment of the effectiveness of bulk collection, from inception as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP) in the fall of 2001 until 2007. It is revealing about both the NSA and its bulk collection program. The NSA's inspector general only reported the agency's top brass beliefs; his report merely quoted then NSA Director Michael Hayden in his view that there were "no communications more important to NSA efforts to defend the nation". Other inspectors general were more skeptical. The Department of Justice "concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts". The CIA reported: [W]orking-level CIA analysts and targeting officers who were read into the PSP had too many competing priorities, and too many other information sources and analytic tools available to them, to fully utilize PSP reporting. Officials also stated that much of the PSP reporting was vague or without context, which led analysts and targeting officers to rely more heavily on other information sources and analytic tools, which were more easily accessed and timely than the PSP. The inspector general of the DNI reported that "[National Counterterrorism Center](http://www.nctc.gov/)analysts characterized the PSP information as being a useful tool, but noted that the information was only one of several valuable sources of information available to them", and "not of greater value than other sources of intelligence". It is hardly surprising that supporters of bulk collection fervently believe it is critical to national security. No psychologically well-balanced person could permit herself to support a program that compromises the privacy of tens of millions of Americans, costs billions of dollars, and imposes direct and articulable harm to cyber security by undermining the security of commercial products and public standards without holding such a belief truly and honestly. But the honest faith of insiders that their bureaucratic mission is true and critical is no substitute for credible evidence. A dozen years of experience has produced many public overstatements and much hype from insiders, but nothing to support the proposition that the program works at all, much less that its marginal contribution is significant enough to justify its enormous costs in money, freedom, and destabilization of internet security. No rational cost-benefit analysis could justify such a leap of faith. If the NSA cannot show real, measurable evidence of its effectiveness, evidence that doesn't collapse as soon as it is examined and isn't a vague appeal to amorphous, measurement-free "peace of mind", its bulk collection program has to go.

# WOT – Answers to: NAS LINK

### NSA ineffective – info-overload

**Puiu 2015**

Tibi, ZME Science “The NSA is gathering so much data, it’s become swamped and ironically ineffective at preventing terrorism” http://www.zmescience.com/research/technology/nsa-overwhelmed-data-53354/  
[One](http://www.zmescience.com/research/technology/nsa-overwhelmed-data-53354/) of the most famous NSA whistleblowers (or the ‘original NSA whistleblower’), William Binney, said the agency is collecting stupendous amounts of data – so much that it’s actually hampering intelligence operations. Binney worked for three decades for the intelligence agency, but left shortly after the 9/11 attacks. A program he had developed was scrapped and replaced with a system he said was more expensive and more intrusive, which made him feel he worked for an incompetent employer. Plans to enact the now controversial Patriot Act was the last straw, so he quit. Since then, Binney has frequently criticized the agency and revealed some of its operations hazards and weaknesses. Among these, he alleges: The NSA buried key intelligence that could have prevented 9/11; The agency’s bulk data collection from internet and telephone communications is unconstitutional and illegal in the US; Electronic intelligence gathering is being used for covert law enforcement, political control and industrial espionage, both in and beyond the US; Edward Snowden’s leaks could have been prevented. Ironically, Snowden cites Binney as an inspiration. His greatest insights however is that the NSA is ineffective at preventing terrorism because analysts are too swamped with information under its bulk collection programme. Considering Binney’s impeccable track record – he was co-founder and director of the World Geopolitical & Military Analysis at the Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center (SARC), a branch with 6,000 employees – I can only presume he knows what he’s talking about. The Patriot Act is a U.S. law passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Its goals are to strengthen domestic security and broaden the powers of law-enforcement agencies with regards to identifying and stopping terrorists. In effect, the law laxes the restrictions authorities have to search telephone, e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records. Because a lot of people use web services whose servers are located in the US, this means that the records of people not located or doing business in the US are also spied upon by the NSA. All this information, however, comes at a price: overload. According to the Guardian, the NSA buffers a whooping  [21 petabytes a day](http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa)! In this flood of information, an NSA analyst will quickly find himself overwhelmed. Queering keywords like “bomb” or “drugs” might prove a nightmare for the analyst in question. It’s impossible not to, considering four billion people — around two-thirds of the world’s population — are under the NSA and partner agencies’ watchful eyes, according to Binney. “That’s why they couldn’t stop the Boston bombing, or the Paris shootings, because the data was all there,” said Binney for [ZDnet](http://www.zdnet.com/article/nsa-whistleblower-overwhelmed-with-data-ineffective/?tag=nl.e539&s_cid=e539&ttag=e539&ftag=TRE17cfd61).

# WOT – Answers to: NAS LINK

### Information from NSA is not used or shared properly

**Eddington 2015**

Patrick Eddington is a policy analyst in homeland security and civil liberties at the Cato Institute. He was formerly a senior policy advisor to Rep. Rush Holt (D-N.J.) and a military imagery analyst at the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center. “No, Mass Surveillance Won't Stop Terrorist Attacks” http://reason.com/archives/2015/01/27/mass-surveillance-and-terrorism#.0wxmih:U8Io

The recent terrorist attack [on the office of French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo](http://reason.com/topics/charlie-hebdo-shooting" \t "_blank) generated a now-familiar meme: Another terrorist attack means we need more surveillance. Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) [said](http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/republicans-on-capitol-hill-paris-shooting-shows-congress-can-t-hamstring-nsa-20150107" \t "_blank) that while "Congress having oversight certainly is important ... what is more important relative to these types of events is ensuring we don't overly hamstring the NSA's ability to collect this kind of information in advance and keep these kinds of activities from occurring." Similarly, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) spoke of his "fear" that "our intelligence capabilities, those designed to prevent such an attack from taking place on our shores, are quickly eroding," adding that the government surveillance "designed to prevent these types of attacks from occurring is under siege." A recent [poll](http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2015/01/18/National-Politics/Polling/release_383.xml" \t "_blank) demonstrates that their sentiments are widely shared in the wake of the attack. But would more mass surveillance have prevented the assault on the Charlie Hebdo office? Events from 9/11 to the present help provide the answer: 2009: Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—i.e., the "underwear bomber"—nearly succeeded in downing the airline he was on over Detroit because, according to then-National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) director Michael Leiter, the federal [Intelligence Community](http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/member-agencies.html" \t "_blank)(IC) failed "[to connect, integrate, and fully understand the intelligence](http://www.voanews.com/content/intelligence-officials-underwear-bomber-plane--82193462/111607.html" \t "_blank)" it had collected. 2009: Army Major Nidal Hasan was able to conduct his deadly, Anwar al-Awlaki-inspired rampage at Ft. Hood, Texas, because the FBI [bungled](http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/nidal-hasan-anwar-awlaki-emails-fbi-fort-hood" \t "_blank) its Hasan investigation. 2013: The Boston Marathon bombing happened, at least in part, because the CIA, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), FBI, NCC, and National Security Agency (NSA) failed to properly coordinate and share information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and his family, associations, and travel to and from Russia in 2012. Those failures were detailed in a 2014 [report](https://www.emptywheel.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/140411-Marathon-IG-Report.pdf" \t "_blank) prepared by the Inspectors General of the IC, Department of Justice, CIA, and DHS. 2014: The Charlie Hebdo and French grocery store attackers were not only known to French and U.S. authorities but one had [a prior terrorism conviction](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/12/-sp-charlie-hebdo-attackers-kids-france-radicalised-paris" \t "_blank) and another was [monitored for years](http://ktla.com/2015/01/10/charlie-hebdo-attacker-underwear-bomber-were-possibly-roommates-cnn/" \t "_blank) by French authorities until less than a year before the attack on the magazine. No, mass surveillance does not prevent terrorist attacks. It’s worth remembering that the mass surveillance programs initiated by the U.S. government after the 9/11 attacks—the [legal ones](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriot_Act" \t "_blank) and the [constitutionally-dubious ones](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stellar_Wind" \t "_blank)—were premised on the belief that bin Laden’s hijacker-terrorists were able to pull off the attacks because of a failure to collect enough data. Yet in their subsequent reports on the attacks, the [Congressional Joint Inquiry (2002)](https://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/911rept.pdf" \t "_blank) and the [9/11 Commission](http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf" \t "_blank) found exactly the opposite. The data to detect (and thus foil) the plots was in the U.S. government’s hands prior to the attacks; the failures were ones of sharing, analysis, and dissemination. That malady perfectly describes every intelligence failure from Pearl Harbor to the present day. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (created by Congress in 2004) was supposed to be the answer to the "failure-to-connect-the-dots" problem. Ten years on, the problem remains, the IC bureaucracy is bigger than ever, and our government is continuing to rely on mass surveillance programs that have failed time and again to stop terrorists while simultaneously undermining the civil liberties and personal privacy of every American. The quest to "[collect it all](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/15/crux-nsa-collect-it-all" \t "_blank)," to borrow a phrase from NSA Director Keith Alexander, only leads to the accumulation of masses of useless information, making it harder to find real threats and [costing billions](http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/10/07/the-nsas-hugely-expensive-utah-data-center-has-major-electrical-problems-and-basically-isnt-working/" \t "_blank) to store. A recent Guardian editorial [noted](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jan/12/guardian-view-on-mass-surveillance" \t "_blank) that such mass-surveillance myopia is spreading among European political leaders as well, despite the fact that "terrorists, from 9/11 to the Woolwich jihadists and the neo-Nazi Anders Breivik, have almost always come to the authorities’ attention before murdering." Mass surveillance is not only destructive of our liberties, its continued use is a virtual guarantee of more lethal intelligence failures. And our continued will to disbelieve those facts is a mental dodge we engage in at our peril.

# WOT – Answers to: THREATS ARE REAL

### The obsession with Al-Qaeda is based on a misappropriation of language – in reality they pose a smaller risk then the West poses to itself

McQuillan, 2009

(Martin, MA, PhD, Glasgow, Deconstruction After 9/11, Routledge, pg. 5-6)

Conversely, and for a long time (although I think now this particular image has been demystified) the boldness of the attacks, arriving (seem- ingly) out of a clear blue sky, allowed for the equal magnification of their perpetrators as giants on the world stage, rather than the rump of a failed death cult lashing out at its own one-time sponsor and ally. Here again the idiomatic enters into the universal through a powerful metonymic projection. `Al Qaeda' can be translated from the Arabic as camp' or `base' and more often than not this is taken by a literal-minded Western media to refer to the training camps for Jihad, the existence which provided the pretext for the swift retribution handed out in Afghanistan, treating an entire nation for the actions of its own aberrant synecdoche. However, perhaps the most appropriate way of translating 'Al Qaeda' is as it is used in the Arab idiom, meaning `database', an index of names or grouped identities. It is a base without foundation, a base of relations only, which as relations have an exchange value but no presence as such. Just as this techno-thanto-teleological sect emerged as a figure of global conspiracy, so any genuine organisational connectivity was dispersed by the comprehensive and overwhelming response of the American military. If Al Qaeda, and its metonym Bin Laden, live on (and will outlive its adversaries in the Bush regime) it is .as the projection of a monstrous ideological inversion, whereby this local detail of the end of the Cold War comes to represent (by confusion and design) a wider conflict between the followers of the book and between the West and its others. No doubt there is a real Al Qaeda and that they are capable of the most appalling acts of indiscriminate violence (one of the effects of the deliberate opacity of `the war on terror' has been to remove the capacity for certainty and to encourage a residual doubt with respect to the risk posed by such people). However, given the limited scale of the 'Al Qaeda' problem and the extent of its operation since 9/11, it is only by an extraordinary Munchausen projection which exploits the image of a genuine terror and real death, that it can be claimed that this group (on its own, if it is one and if it is co-ordinated) represents an equal threat to Western values and hegemony as the mutually assured destruction of -the Cold War or the lethal potential of the blitzkrieg.' In this respect, Al Qaeda is the least of the West's enemies, and yet for the logocentric West names and the naming of parts are important. The appellation of 'Al Qaeda' carries a terrifying metonymic power, conferred onto the disparate groups that take up this sobriquet in Iraq and other theatres, like the `Dread Pirate Roberts' who terrorised the seven seas for several generations as the name was handed down to a successor on the wealthy retirement of each Dread Pirate Roberts.

### Terrorism Adv – Nuclear 1NC

# WOT – Answers to: NUCLEAR TERRORISM SCENARIO

### Nuclear terrorist threats are exaggerated

Gertz and Lake 2010

(Bill and Eli, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/obama-says-terrorist-nuclear-risk-is-growing/?page=1, dw:4-14-2010, da: 7-6-2011, lido)

But Henry Sokolski, a member of the congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass , Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, said that there is no specific intelligence on ongoing terrorist procurement of nuclear material. “We were given briefings and when we tried to find specific intelligence on the threat of any known terrorist efforts to get a bomb, the answer was we did not have any.” Mr. Obama told reporters that there was a range of views on the danger but that all the conferees “agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat.” Mr. Sokolski said the idea that “we know that this is eminent has got to be somehow informed conjecture and apprehension, [but] it is not driven by any specific intelligence per se.” “We have reasons to believe this and to be worried, but we don’t have specific intelligence about terrorist efforts to get the bomb,” he said. “So we have to do general efforts to guard against his possibility, like securing the material everywhere.” A senior U.S. intelligence official also dismissed the administration’s assertion that the threat of nuclear terrorism is growing. “The threat has been there,” the official said. “But there is no new intelligence.” The official said the administration appears to be inflating the danger in ways similar to what critics of the Bush administration charged with regard to Iraq: hyping intelligence to support its policies. The official said one likely motivation for the administration’s new emphasis on preventing nuclear terrorism is to further the president’s goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. While the U.S. nuclear arsenal would be useful in retaliating against a sovereign state, it would be less so against a terrorist group. But if the latter is the world’s major nuclear threat, the official explained, then the U.S. giving up its weapons seems less risky.

### Terrorists won’t get nukes

Gertz and Lake 10 (Bill and Eli, Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/14/obama-says-terrorist-nuclear-risk-is-growing/?page=1, dw:4-14-2010, da: 7-6-2011, lido)

However, Brian Jenkins, author of the book “Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?” and a Rand Corp. adviser, said that al Qaeda in the past has been duped by supposed nuclear suppliers who initiated scams that suggest a “naivete and lack of technical capability on the part of the organization,” he said. “We have evidence of terrorist ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons or nuclear material but we have no evidence of terrorist capabilities to do either,” he said. In late 2001, after the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, some materials were discovered in al Qaeda bases such as crude diagrams of the basic components of a nuclear bomb. Mr. Jenkins, however, said that U.S. technical specialists concluded from the designs that al Qaeda did not have the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. In 2002, members of al Qaeda’s affiliate in Saudi Arabia attempted to purchase Russian nuclear devices through al Qaeda’s leadership in Iran, though the transactions did not move forward. In his 2007 memoir, “At the Center of the Storm,” Mr. Tenet wrote that “from the end of 2002 to the spring of 2003, we received a stream of reliable reporting that the senior al-Qaeda leadership in Saudi Arabia was negotiating for the purchase of three Russian nuclear devices.” Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and author of a book on nuclear terrorism, said he agrees with the president that the threat is growing, based on North Korea’s nuclear proliferation to Syria and instability in nuclear-armed Pakistan.

# WOT – Answers to: NUCLEAR TERRORISM SCENARIO

### Terrorists would not be able to steal a bomb – security, no place to buy

Milhollin 2 (Gary, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, commentary magazine, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/pubs/articles/2002/terror-bomb.htm, dw:Aug 2001, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

If making nuclear-bomb fuel is a no-go, why not just steal it, or buy it on the black market? Consider plutonium. There are hundreds of reactors in the world, and they crank out tons of the stuff every year. Surely a dedicated band of terrorists could get their hands on some. This too is not so simple. Plutonium is only created inside reactor fuel rods, and the rods, after being irradiated, become so hot that they melt unless kept under water. They are also radioactive, which is why they have to travel submerged from the reactor to storage ponds, with the water acting as both coolant and radiation shield. And in most power reactors, the rods are welded together into long assemblies that can be lifted only by crane. True, after the rods cool down they can be stored dry, but their radioactivity is still lethal. To prevent spent fuel rods from killing the people who come near them, they are transported in giant radiation-shielding casks that are not supposed to break open even in head-on collisions. The casks are also guarded. If terrorists managed to hijack one from a country that had reactors they would still have to take it to a plant in another country that could extract the plutonium from the rods. They would be hunted at every step of the way.

### Nuclear terrorism won’t cause extinction–the U.S. would easily recover

Frost 5(Robin, teaches political science at Simon Fraser University, British Colombia, “Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11,” Adelphi Papers, December)

An existential threat. **When applied to nuclear terrorism, the phrase ‘existential threat’ implies that a state such as the United States could be destroyed by terrorists wielding nuclear weapons. Yet to destroy the United States or any other large industrial state**, in the sense of inflicting such damage to its government, economy, population and infrastructure that it could no longer function as a coherent political and economic entity, **would require a large number of well-placed nuclear weapons with yields in the tens or hundreds of kilotons. It is unlikely that terrorists could successfully obtain, emplace and detonate a single nuclear weapon, while no plausible radiological device or devices could do any significant damage on a national level.**

# WOT – Answers to: BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIO

### BIOPOLITICS LINKS

### The rhetoric of bioterror as a threat to life enables the state’s acquisition of biopolitical control, and justifies wholesale slaughter in the name of survival.

Thacker 2007- Associate Professor, School of Literature, Communication, & Culture, Georgia Institute of Technology (Eugene, “Nomos, nosos and bios in the body politic,” <http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/view/25/32>)

For Foucault, biopolitics involves three main processes, working in concert. The first is a redeployment of medical knowledge concerning the biology of populations. Here the notion of population becomes the bearer of all medical and social specificity. Biopolitics 'tends to treat the "population" as a mass of living and coexisting beings who present particular biological and pathological traits and who thus come under specific knowledge and technologies' (Foucault, 1997: 71). But this process of accounting for the population as simultaneously political and medical implies a certain quantitative sophistication. Thus, in addition to a medical view of the population, there is a second element, which is the development of a set of numerical, statistical, and informatic means of defining and thus managing the population. This is the biology of large numbers, which has its beginnings, for instance, in the regular use of mortality tables kept by parishes in 17th century England (Porter, 1997: 236-38). Its aim is 'to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race' (Foucault, 1997: 73). Finally, a last element is required for biopolitics to function, and that is an infrastructure for performing this ongoing statistics of the population. This is where what Foucault calls governmentality, or the art of governing, comes into play, in which 'the movement that brings about the emergence of population as a datum' provides the conditions for 'an objective of governmental techniques' (Foucault 2000: 219). The concerns of population characteristics in light of political economy -- the mercantilist view that the health of the population equals the wealth of the population -- is but one example of governmental management of biopolitical concerns. But it is in this last element that Foucault's points about biopolitics have the most resonance for our current context of bioterrorism and emerging infectious disease. In his Collège lectures, Foucault says more about the governmentality specific to biopolitics. He asks, 'How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?' (2003: 254). In other words, what is the relation between older forms of sovereignty and the emerging, modern biopolitical practices of public health policy, hospital reform, the professionalization of medicine, and the methods of statistics and demographics? Foucault offers one response, which is that 'the acquisition of power over man insofar as man is a living being, that the biological came under State control, that there was at least a certain tendency that leads to what might be termed State control of the biological' (2003: 239-40). But how is the exceptional character of sovereign power instantiated in such decentralized systems, in which the bureaucratic management of numbers and bodies takes hold? There must be some set of principles for allowing, in exceptional circumstances, the introduction of sovereign power. In other words, there must be some set of conditions that can be identified as a threat, such that a corresponding state of emergency can be claimed, in which the formerly decentralized apparatus of biopolitics suddenly constricts into the exception of sovereignty. 'It is at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States' (2003: 254). But I would argue that Foucault means 'racism' here in a specific, medical and biological sense. Racism in this sense is a biologically-inflected political relation in which war is rendered as fundamentally biological: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital Â… the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. (1978: 137) In a curious turn of phrase, Foucault later calls this a 'democratization of sovereignty,' a condition in which the sovereign state of emergency emerges through a widespread and generalized threat to the population (2003: 37). In such conditions, both a medical-biological view of the population, and a statistical-informatic means of accounting for the population, converge in the identification of potential threats and possible measures of security. In a sense, it is war that acts as the hinge between population and information, but a war that always puts at stake the biological existence of the population (and thus nation). The body natural, even as it serves as an analogy for the body politic, is always what is fundamentally at stake in the body politic.

# WOT – Answers to: BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIO

### Biological and Chemical terrorism is hard to have

Sievers 1 (Rod, staff, http://news.siuc.edu/news/October01/100901r1152.html, dw: 10-9-2001, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

"Certainly, bio and chemical terrorism is a credible threat," said Talley, the associate director of SIUC's Center for Environmental Health and Safety, "but it's not very practical for terrorists who want immediate results." Take crop dusters for instance. "Sure, someone could load up a crop duster with deadly chemicals or biologicals, but those agents would have to be spread over a very large, populated area to have any chance of causing a lot of harm," Talley said. "Getting a crop duster to fly over a large city at a low altitude just isn't very probable." Spraying deadly chemicals onto crops is a more likely scenario, but Talley believes the U.S. Department of Agriculture or the Food and Drug Administration, responsible for ensuring the safety of America's food supply, would be quick to quarantine contaminated food.

### Biological and chemical terrorism have too many barriers

Sievers 1 (Rod, staff, http://news.siuc.edu/news/October01/100901r1152.html, dw: 10-9-2001, da: 7-9-2011, lido)

Talley admits that biohazards such as anthrax can do quite a bit of damage. But he notes that they are hard to produce in large quantities. "Other materials, such as Sarin gas, are more deadly, Talley said, "but again, it is very difficult to acquire these materials. And anyone handling this stuff would have to know what he's doing in order to minimize the risks to themselves. "There's something to be concerned about regarding all the different ways that a terrorist might use biohazards in an attack. But since each method and each type of chemical or biological involves so many factors, it would be pretty difficult to carry off a successful, large-scale attack."

# WOT – Answers to: Economy Scenarios

### Developed economies are resilient to attacks

**Bandyopadhyay et al 2015**

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Disrupting production Economic researchers have found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that rich, large, and diversified economies are better able to withstand the effects of terrorist attacks than small, poor, and more specialized economies. If terrorism disrupts productive activities in one sector in a diversified economy, resources can easily flow to another unaffected sector. In addition, richer economies have more and better resources to devote to counterterrorism efforts, which presumably reduces the number of terrorist activities with which they must cope. In contrast, small developing economies, which are specialized in a few sectors, may not have such resilience. Resources such as labor or capital may either flow from an affected sector to less productive activities within the country or move to another country entirely. Moreover, developing economies are likely to lack specialized resources—such as surveillance equipment or a technologically advanced police force or army—that can be employed in counterterrorism. This allows the terrorist threat to persist, which can scare away potential investors. A terrorist attack against such a nation is likely to impose larger and more lasting macroeconomic costs. The dramatic attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, for example, caused an estimated $80 billion in losses. Large as they were, however, the losses were a tiny fraction (less than 0.1 percent) of the nearly $10.6 trillion 2001 U.S. GDP. Similarly, Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides (2004) found rather modest effects on average in 177 nations from transnational terrorist attacks during 1968–2000. Per capita GDP growth was reduced by 0.048 percent on an annual basis. But the effects are more dire in smaller nations, such as Colombia and Israel, and regions, such as the Basque Country in Spain, where terrorism-related damage has been much more significant. For example, terrorism cost the Basque Country more than 10 percent in per capita GDP losses from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, when the problem was acute (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Moreover, terrorism affects economies differently, depending on their stage of development. Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) divided a sample of 42 Asian countries into 7 developed and 35 developing economies. Their estimates suggest that terrorism did not significantly hamper growth in the developed economies, but they show that each additional transnational terrorist incident (per million people) reduced an affected developing economy’s growth rate by about 1.4 percent. These findings further support the notion that smaller developing economies are more economically vulnerable to terrorism than those that are richer and diversified.

# WOT – Answers to: Lone Wolf

### Surveillance doesn’t solve – independence makes communications limited

**Barrabi 2015**

Tom Barrabi is a reporter for the International Business Times. He graduated from Fairfield University in 2011, and has also written for Men's Fitness, Complex, GuySpeed, and Handlebar Magazine. “'Lone Wolf' Terrorism: US, Europe Adopt New Security Tactics To Counteract Homegrown Threats” http://www.ibtimes.com/lone-wolf-terrorism-us-europe-adopt-new-security-tactics-counteract-homegrown-threats-1782520

Said and Cherif Kouachi’s fatal shooting of 12 people in Paris last week cast an international spotlight on the global intelligence community's ongoing struggle to identify and eliminate “lone wolf’ terrorism. The Charlie Hebdo magazine massacre, along with a recent rash of other attacks, have made it clear that mass casualty events are no longer perpetrated solely by traditional militant groups. Faced with the enhanced surveillance and collaboration from Western intelligence agencies after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, militant groups like the Islamic State or al Qaeda have increasingly called on sympathizers to act individually against their own communities. Other “lone wolves” develop their own ideology or reason for taking violent action against their neighbors. Traditional law enforcement tactics have proven ineffective at counteracting this new foe. “The consequences of attacks from terrorist groups are higher than from lone wolves. However, the likelihood of a lone wolf attack happening is higher, precisely because it’s so difficult to prevent,” said Max Abrahms, a terrorism theorist with the Council on Foreign Relations. “Usually, authorities are able to foil attacks by intercepting communications among people. But lone wolves by definition are more solitary, and so the writing often isn’t on the wall.” The Kouachi brothers, along with apparent co-conspirator and Paris supermarket hostage-taker Amedy Coulibaly, were each known to intelligence officials in Europe and the United States prior to the terrorist murders last week. All three were French citizens who lived among the communities that they later targeted for attacks, with known ties to domestic radical organizations. Cherif Kouachi, for example, once appeared on a French television documentary on local Muslims who were outraged by Western intervention in Iraq, and served prison time on terrorism charges in 2008. Said Kouachi was never arrested for ties to radical groups, but U.S. and European authorities knew that he traveled to Yemen in 2011 to meet with al Qaeda preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, who publicly advocated for “lone wolf”-style attacks before he was killed in a U.S. drone strike, according to [The Daily Beast](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/24/in-canada-the-stray-dogs-of-isis.html" \t "_blank). Coulibaly and the Kouachis were known members of France’s “Buttes-Chaumont” Islamist network, a group with ties to the Islamic State that trained on French soil, [the Telegraph](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11334249/Charlie-Hebdo-attack-the-Kouachi-brothers-and-the-network-of-French-Islamists-with-links-to-Islamic-State.html" \t "_blank) reports. Known militant entities, such as the Islamic State group or Yemen’s al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), purportedly inspired the Kouachis and Coulibaly to commit their acts. But early indications suggest that neither group provided direct operational support or was in direct communication with the alleged terrorists at the time of the assaults. Under the traditional paradigms of counterterrorism, law enforcement agencies have relied on surveillance and informants to foil major terrorist plots. But “lone wolves” operate independently from the known structure of Islamist militancy. A would-be terrorist doesn’t have to meet directly with al Qaeda or the Islamic State group to gain the expertise necessary to carry out a mass-casualty event. “It used to be, even in the world of violent extremism, you had pockets of people who were separated by geography,” said John Cohen, a former counterterrorism coordinator at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and a professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey. “Today, that’s all different. You no longer have to travel thousands of miles to meet up with people who share your view of an extremist ideology. You no longer have to go out into the woods and train in person. You can actually acquire materials, acquire expertise, acquire abilities while never leaving your house.” The Islamic State group has especially embraced the potential of online propaganda, producing everything from pamphlets to music videos to attract recruits. Authorities found ISIS flags at Coulibaly’s hideout, and the 32-year-old made a video declaring his allegiance to the group despite there being no indication that he had engaged in direct contact with its leaders, [Newsday](http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/amedy-coulibaly-gunman-in-paris-siege-pledges-loyalty-to-islamic-state-in-posthumous-video-1.9795808" \t "_blank) reports. It’s a problem that isn’t limited to Europe. Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the brothers responsible for the “lone wolf” Boston Marathon bombing that left three dead and hundreds injured in 2013, were[purportedly inspired](http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/26/the-awlaki-connection.html" \t "_blank) to commit their act after listening to al-Awlaki’s Internet sermons. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev later admitted that they learned how to make the pressure-cooker explosives used in the attack by reading AQAP’s instructions online. Similar “self-radicalization” motivated [Man Haron Monis](http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2014/dec/15/man-haron-monis-sydney-siege-suspect" \t "_blank), a preacher in Australia who pledged solidarity with the Islamic State group in his deadly seizure of hostages at a Sydney café last December. Without direct ties to link “lone wolf” terrorists to known radical entities, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security relies on the convergence of traditional tactics – undercover operations, surveillance and wiretaps – with psychological analysis of individuals who could pose a threat to their communities. Efforts are made to identify proactive “intervention strategies” to head off attacks before they can occur, such as mental health counseling and faith education. Rather than simply react to a prospective threat’s radicalization, law enforcement officials are making an effort to understand why that radicalization occurred in the first place. “You hear a lot of emphasis from some in government about, ‘We have to counter the narrative.’ That may be true, but I think the bigger issue is we need to really understand why in Western Europe and Canada and the United States that a growing number of people seem to find resonance with the narrative of these [radical] groups, and figure out what those underlying issues are and address those underlying issues,” Cohen said.

# WOT – Answers to: Agro-terror

### They’ll find vulnerabilities – traceability doesn’t solve

**IHLS News Desk 2015**

“Agroterrorism – is this a real threat?” http://i-hls.com/2015/01/agroterrorism-real-threat/

Is the food supply in the U.S a potential target for terrorists? The economic effects of a successful attack on the U.S. food supply would be devastating, as agriculture accounts for roughly 13 percent of the country’s gross annual domestic product. An introduction of deadly pathogens into U.S. livestock, poultry, or crops would not only result in a disease outbreak, but would disrupt the global food industry and drive up food prices. Agroterrorism is not limited to the intentional introduction of harmful pathogens into U.S. farms and livestock. Terrorists can also cyberattack industrial agriculture systems responsible for operating feeding machines, maintaining milk temperatures, and processing foods. - See more at: http://i-hls.com/2015/01/agroterrorism-real-threat/#sthash.ABg1TV2T.dpuf According to HomeLand Security News Wire, the ease of a cyberattack, and its anonymous nature, have some terrorism analysts questioning the likelihood of a physical bioattack on the U.S food supply. Robert A. Norton, a veterinary microbiologist with research interests in cybersecurity and public health, insists that terrorists are not likely to plan an attack for which the government has prepared a response. They often seek the path of least resistance. Industrial agriculture systems are vulnerable to cyberattacks and terrorists have the expertise to exploit those vulnerabilities. - See more at: <http://i-hls.com/2015/01/agroterrorism-real-threat/#sthash.ABg1TV2T.dpuf>

### Agro-terror is more complex than just targeting livestock – traceability won’t solve

**Norton 14** -- Robert Norton, Auburn University Open Source Intelligence LabAgroterrorism – is the threat real? http://southeastfarmpress.com/government/agroterrorism-threat-real

Are terrorists going to target the food we eat? In my professional estimation the likelihood is moderately high, but if proven a reality, I would seriously wager that it won’t come in the direction for which the government has planned (and spent) to respond. Terrorists, like most people tend to be lazy and most often seek the path of least resistance, so as to better assure a probable success. Rather than using biological weapons to kill cattle or poisons to contaminate milk, why not just turn off the electricity? Doing that can kill the animals (e.g., chickens in commercial operations), spoils the milk and makes the ground beef inedible, with the extra special bonus that it also causes everyone to plunge into darkness (widespread panic), shutters access to bank ATMs and fuel, causes breathtaking gridlock and makes the government look totally helpless and inept. More importantly, all can be done from the comfort of the local cyber cafe where the hacker(s) don’t even to have to break a sweat. The cyber realm is where the greatest vulnerability in food and agriculture resides; therefore it by definition it becomes the most likely target. Also importantly, the adversary has both the means (expertise) and the access points (the web), by which that vulnerability can be attacked. The U.S. government should continue to plan for all contingencies, including those attacks that emanate from the very computers that make modern life possible. Failure to adequately defend will not only enable tragedy to be assured, but at a scale that we cannot even imagine.